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ABSTRACT 
Far from being solely a terrorist organization, Hamas is a heterogeneous 
movement, which has situational awareness and uses violence or political participation 
after a cost-benefit analysis. Hamas’ main objective is to stay in power and preserve its 
identity. Hamas is unlikely to publicly reject its ideology. Two opinions about Hamas are 
prevalent. On the one hand, Hamas is assessed as a radical terrorist organization. The 
policy implication of this first opinion is simple: Hamas cannot be reformed and will 
continue to use violence. Therefore, Hamas must be neutralized. On the other hand, 
Hamas is assessed as a social movement, which does not necessarily need to use 
violence. This school of thought assesses Hamas as a movement that can learn to refrain 
from violence. The policy implication of this position is that Hamas’ inclusion in politics 
supports the process of moderation of Hamas into a non-violent organization. Both 
policies proved either to be ineffective or imply risks. This thesis asserts a middle 
position. Hamas’ decisions to act depend on two factors. First, its internal situation is of 
importance. Second, and even more important, the political and situational circumstances 
on the ground in Palestine have a strong impact on Hamas. The middle position implies 
that the situation on the ground can be influenced in a way that may give Hamas little or 
no incentive to use violence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
In 2006, Palestinians conducted the first free elections for the Palestine National 
Authority (PA). Few expected Hamas to win the landslide victory the world observed in 
the elections. Western diplomats had assessed Hamas as a radical Islamic organization 
preferring violence rather than political participation to pursue its goals. Despite this 
presumption, Hamas won 76 of 132 seats in the government, ending Fatah’s domination 
of the PA.1 In the aftermath, Hamas and the Fatah dominated the PA and shared a short 
period of cooperation before tensions between the two factions led to the violent outbreak 
of factional struggle. Hamas established a one-party regime in the Gaza Strip, routed the 
Fatah from the Strip and contained other competitors, while the PA and Fatah governed 
the West Bank.2 The operation “Cast Lead,” conducted by the Israeli Defense Force at 
the end of December 2008 to January 2009, was the latest effort to deal with Hamas in a 
military operation in order to weaken Hamas and end its rule over the Gaza Strip.3 The 
                                                 
1  Menachem Klein, "Hamas in Power," The Middle East Journal 61, no. 3 (Summer 2007), 442. 
2  International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing no. 24: Round Two in Gaza (Gaza City/ Ramallah/ 
Brussels: International Crisis Group [2008]) (accessed September 18, 2008). 
3  International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing no. 26: Ending the War in Gaza (Gaza City, 
Ramallah, Jerusalem, Brussels: International Crisis Group [2009]), 20; Jeffrey White, "Operation 'Cast 
Lead': Israel's Assault on Hamas," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2976 (accessed January 4, 2009); Mohammad 
Yaghi, "The Impact of the Gaza Conflict on Palestinian Politics," Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2978 (accessed January 4, 2009). 
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operation ended in a shaky truce with Hamas beaten but not defeated.4 Some analyses 
assess Hamas to be more powerful after the operation.5 
Two opinions about Hamas are prevalent. On the one hand, Hamas is assessed as 
a radical, terrorist organization. This opinion defines Hamas as an organization that will 
always resort to violence and is hostile to every peace process. In this line of thought 
Hamas will always adhere to its agenda to annihilate Israel, which makes any moderate 
approach impossible.6 The international community follows this “prevailing image of 
Hamas as an ideologically intransigent and political rigid movement, ready to pursue its 
goals at any cost, with no limits or constraints.”7 The Middle East Quartet (the United 
Nations, UN, the European Union,  EU, the Unites States of America,  USA, and Russia, 
RUS), formed in 2002 to solve the conflict, still follows this approach. The Middle East 
Quartet refuses to cooperate with Hamas considering it to be a terrorist organization.8 
They try to isolate Hamas in the Gaza Strip and focus any negotiations on president 
Mahmoud Abbas. 
                                                 
4  International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing no. 26: Ending the War in Gaza, 8; BBC News, 
"Israel 'to Announce Gaza Truce'," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7835364.stm 
(accessed January 30, 2009); BBC News, "Hamas Announces Cease Fire in Gaza," BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7836205.stm (accessed January 29, 2009); BBC News, "UN 
'Shocked' by Gaza Destruction," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7846625.stm 
(accessed January 30, 2009). 
5  Zvi Bar'el, "Through the Eyes of a Squad Leader," Haaretz, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1052351.html (accessed January 5, 2009); BBC News, "Who Will 
Rebuild Gaza?" BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7856011.stm (accessed January 29, 
2009); Oded Eran, "Operation Cast Lead: The Diplomatic Dimension. Strategic Assessment, Volume 11, 
no. 4, February 2009," Institute for National Security Studies, 
http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=2651 (accessed February 18, 2009). 
6  Walter Laqueur, Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings, and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and 
Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages (New York, NY: Reed Press, 2004), 
434–438; Barry Rubin, "Setting U.S. Policy Toward Hamas" In Prevent Breakdown, Prepare for 
Breakthrough: How President Obama can Promote Israeli-Palestinian Peace, ed. David Pollock, Vol. 
Policy Focus no. 90 (Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008), 19; Matthew 
Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2006). 
7  Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000), vii. 
8  Nathalie Tocci, "The Impact of Western Policies Towards Hamas and Hezbollah: What Went 
Wrong?" In Political Islam and European Foreign Policy: Perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the 
Mediterranean, eds. Michael Emerson and Richard Youngs (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2007), 139. 
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On the other hand, Hamas is assessed by scholars and political experts on the 
Middle East as a social movement, which does not necessarily solely need to use 
violence. Hamas’ roots lie with the nonviolent approach of the early Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB), to change society by education; and Hamas has devoted a great deal of energy 
recently to contesting elections peacefully.9 This implies that Hamas is not inextricably 
bound to violence, but to the support of the people, and thus can and does change its 
tactics and stances. While adhering to its radical agenda, the organization is able to 
combine that agenda with strategic thinking and pragmatic politics. From this 
perspective, Hamas is an organization that is driven by cost-benefit analysis, strategic 
assessments, and pragmatism. As a consequence, negotiations with the group are useful 
and necessary. 
Both perspectives emphasize only a particular part of Hamas, either its use of 
violence or its political development. But Hamas must be analyzed and understood by the 
complexity of its organization and the interdependency of its actions to internal and 
external influences. Therefore, it is important to pose the following questions:  
 What are the domestic, international, and internal organizational factors 
that shape Hamas’ behavior and lead to either pragmatic non-violent 
action or the use of violence?  
 Is Hamas’ ideological movement driven by absolute religious principles 
that cannot be compromised, or is it a pragmatic organization capable of 
justifying compromise even on a seemingly immutable doctrine? 
The major players in the Middle East Peace process, the United States, Europe, 
and Israel, reject negotiation with Hamas as an official Palestinian faction. Although 
Hamas gained its political position in official elections, Hamas is seen as a terrorist 
group. The isolation approach by the United States, Europe, and Israel, which aims at the 
neutralization of Hamas and the support of the PA under President Abbas, is failing. Not  
 
 
                                                 
9  Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, 16. 
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only is Hamas still in power and controlling the Gaza Strip, the isolation favors the 
hardliners in the Hamas leadership and accelerated the internal political division of 
Palestine. 
This thesis argues that assessing Hamas solely as a terrorist organization does not 
take the real nature of this movement into consideration. Hamas is a dynamic social 
movement that is shaped by, and responsive to, changing circumstances in both its 
violent and political facets. Participation in the 2006 elections shows that Hamas does not 
solely adhere to violence, but also uses pragmatic politics by which the group conducts 
situational and strategic assessments of internal Palestinian politics and of the nationalist 
struggle. It is possible, as well, for the Middle East Quartet and for Israel, to approach 
Hamas in dialogue, whether directly or indirectly. This opens a window of opportunity 
for reaching agreements and progress in the peace process. 
A review of the available analyses of Hamas, and the current developments, 
shows that Hamas is capable of political participation and refraining from violence. The 
question is how to foster the more moderate tendencies in the inner factions of Hamas, 
along with how to cope with its maximalist position of “no peace with Israel.” Hamas’ 
history up to its current ascendance to power shows that the use of violence as well as 
political participation are strategic options. The author asserts that these actions are due to 
Hamas’ situational awareness and strategic assessments based on rational decision 
making. This thesis shows that Hamas acts on the basis of pragmatic decisions, not blind 
adherence to an absolute ideology. The implication of this analysis is that dialogue with 
Hamas is possible, which, in turn, could possibly facilitate the organizations rejection of 
violence and embrace of moderation. 
The thesis analyzes Hamas’ organizational behavior and its leadership in order to 
understand under what circumstances Hamas’ leaders tend to favor pragmatic politics. It 
investigates Hamas’ internal structure and networks as well as the divisions between 
internal and external leadership. The thesis identifies how Hamas negotiates and decides 
its political aims, strategy and tactics. Furthermore, the analysis will identify which 
internal groups have what influence on the organization’s course of action. The internal 
balance of power is dependent on external factors as well. “Hamas’ ideology and political 
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practice also are shaped by international and regional circumstances.”10 The international 
circumstances can be described with the attempts of negotiation and peace talks, like the 
1993 Oslo Peace Accord, or the 2006 isolation attempt and its impact on Hamas and its 
course of action, up to the recent escalation. Examples of the internal circumstances that 
influence Hamas are the competition with other factions and groups, like Fatah or the 
Islamic Jihad, as well as living conditions on the ground and public political opinion. The 
thesis analyzes Hamas’ history from 1987 to 2009. Its history is divided into key 
episodes, which are treated as cases subject to analysis. The objective is to analyze each 
case to determine the key factors that shape Hamas’ decision making. 
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Hamas was founded in 1987 as a response by parts of the Palestinian Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) to the first intifada.11 Created by MB leaders under the lead of Sheik 
Ahmad Yassin as a militant organization arm to participate in the intifada, Hamas soon 
matured into an independent organization.12 Its charter claims an independent Palestinian 
state and the destruction of Israel. The organization’s main domestic Palestinian source of 
support is the public; this is the critical requirement for the organization’s survival, 
because it is a broad-based movement. The external source of support is the recognition 
and support from regional regimes like Iran’s. With the beginning of the Oslo Peace 
Process in 1993, Hamas adapted its behavior to the circumstances. Decisions were no 
longer driven by an adherence to violence, but by analysis of the requirements needed to 
maintain the gained position in the Palestinian political sphere.  Additionally, Hamas 
began to evaluate political participation. However, it decided to take an opposition stance 
against the Oslo Peace Accord, Arafat, the PLO, the Fatah, and the newly formed 
Palestinian Authority in order to avoid the risk of being marginalized by the PA. In its 
position, Hamas was in competition against the other Palestinian factions for power. This 
                                                 
10  Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine 
Studies, 2000), 254. 
11 See Appendix A for a chronology of the events. 
12  Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice, 34–35. 
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competition for power strongly influenced Hamas’ behavior in future events. 
Nonetheless, Hamas limited its violence thereby coping with the strong public support for 
the peace process. When the second intifada broke out in 2000, Hamas reengaged in 
violence with full force including suicide attacks. Still, Hamas did not use violence 
against Israel only for the sake of violence. Hamas matured from an armed resistance 
organization to a political factor. During the second intifada, Hamas could gain more 
power from violence than from political participation. This began to change with Arafat’s 
death in 2004 and the vacuum of Palestinian political leadership. Hamas’ main 
competitor, the PA and Fatah, were weakened by inner division, corruption, political 
inability and declining public support. Hamas engaged in political participation and won 
the 2006 elections with its own political party. After Hamas entered the administration, it 
had to deal with governance and the responsibilities of a government. Hamas, as a new 
political factor, was rejected by Israel and the Middle East Quartet. They tried to 
neutralize Hamas by isolating it in the Gaza Strip, preventing any form of governance or 
economic viability and turning the public against Hamas, while at the same time 
supporting the PA. To defend its position, Hamas decided to use violent actions against 
Fatah and the PA. Hamas routed the Fatah and the PA from the Gaza Strip. This led to 
the separation of Palestine into the Gaza Strip, controlled by Hamas, and the West Bank, 
controlled by President Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah. In between, Hamas tried to cope 
with the isolation approach, govern the Gaza Strip and improve living conditions.13 The 
isolation approach failed and Hamas remained in power.14 The blockade of Hamas’ 
attempt to govern, and the deteriorating economic situation on the ground moved Hamas 
                                                 
13  International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing no. 24: Round Two in Gaza. 
14  Khalil Shikaki, "With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options 
for the Peace Process," Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies, no. 1 Crown Center 
Working Papers (February 2007), 7; Sherifa Zuhur and others, "Hamas and the Two-State Solution: 
Villain, Victim Or Missing Ingredient?" Middle East Policy 15, no. 2 (Summer 2008), 11; Palestinian 
Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll no. 29," Palestinian Center for 
Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2008/p29e.html (accessed September 19, 
2008). 
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again towards the use of violence.15 Inside Hamas, the momentum shifted from the 
moderate leaders, who were more willing to participate in politics, to the hardliner 
leaders, who more willing to use violence in order to maintain the movement’s position.16  
This led to a renewed increase of violence and to the Israeli response; operation “Cast 
Lead,” from December 2008 until January 2009. The operation degraded Hamas’ 
administrative infrastructure for ruling the Gaza Strip and its militant capabilities, but it 
neither deprived Hamas of power nor did it leave Hamas non-operational.17 Still, Hamas 
is a political power that must be dealt with in order to revitalize the peace process. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The policy and academic literature house two very different views about the 
nature of Hamas and the kinds of diplomatic strategies most appropriate for dealing with 
the group. One school of thought labels the group as a terrorist organization whose desire 
for the elimination of Israel and embracing of violence pose insurmountable obstacles to 
the Middle East Peace process. A second school of thought stresses the complexity of the 
heterogeneous organization as a social movement; its decision-making process between 
hardliner and moderate leaders, and their internal rivalries; it portrays Hamas as a 
pragmatic organization not committed to violence by nature. In this assessment, Hamas is 
a social movement that can be included in negotiations, which is indispensable to an 
improvement in the peace process. 
                                                 
15  Bernard Gwertzmann, "Israel–Palestinian Crisis Explodes Onto Obama's Agenda," Council on 
Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18080/assessing_the_gaza_flare_up.html?breadcrumb=%2F (accessed 
January 4, 2009); Bar'el, Through the Eyes of a Squad Leader, 1; Yaghi, The Impact of the Gaza Conflict 
on Palestinian Politics; International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing no. 26: Ending the War in Gaza, 
3, 10. 
16  Khaled Hroub, "A New Hamas through its New Documents," Journal of Palestine Studies 35, no. 4 
(2006), 27; Shikaki, With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for 
the Peace Process, 8–9, 16; Jörg Bremer, "Der Angriff Begann Mit Dem Ende Des Gottesdienstes," 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, sec. 1 D3, Monday, December 29, 2008, 3; Matti Friedman, "Hamas Tells 
Fighters to Hold Fire for 24 Hours; Faction Says Truce could be Renewed; Israel Signals Readiness to 
Move into Gaza," The Washington Post, December 23, 2008. 
17  International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing no. 26: Ending the War in Gaza, 20; BBC News, 
Hamas Announces Cease Fire in Gaza; BBC News, Who Will Rebuild Gaza? 
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Those who assess Hamas as a terrorist group, which cannot be reformed, point to 
three factors. First, Hamas is used by Iran as a proxy to support the containment of Israel. 
Second, Hamas is a militia organization that is bound to its religious doctrine and uses its 
organizational structure for maintaining its struggle against Israel. Third, Hamas is a 
cohesive organization which uses its political and social wings only to support, 
legitimize, and cover its conduct of terrorist attacks against Israel. In the first category 
analyses like those of Gawdat Bahgat, Eli Bermann, and Matthew Levitt can be found.  
Gawdat Bahgat focuses on Iran as a source of support for Hamas’ terrorist 
activities. He admits that Iran is not Hamas’ primary base of funding but that the two 
leaderships have close ties to each other.18 Baghat assesses that Iran might not reject a 
Palestinian Israeli peace, but nonetheless uses Hamas to keep Israel focused away from 
Iran.19 His assessment shows the Iranian support for Hamas, but ignores the complexity 
of Palestinian politics. Iranian support certainly helps Hamas, but it cannot explain why 
Hamas uses violence as well as political participation. 
Eli Berman uses an economic approach to analyze Hamas. In his assessment, 
Hamas is a militia group based on radical Islam which turned violent and which can be 
contained by economic means.20 He characterizes Hamas as “highly ritualistic” and 
“extremely conservative.”21 In this assessment, Hamas, as a militia organization, is bound 
to violence due to its character. Its ideology of armed combat against Israel prevents 
Hamas from using politics.22 The organization is developed to maintain this combat.23 
While Berman’s model can explain how a resistance organization can maintain its 
struggle, it does not explain Hamas’ particular behavior in the course of events. His study 
                                                 
18  Gawdat Bahgat, "Terrorism in the Middle East," The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic 
Studies 32, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 174–175. 
19  Ibid., 175. 
20  Eli Berman, Hamas, Taliban, and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical 
Religious Militias (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003), 3, 10. 
21  Ibid., 4. 
22  Ibid., 26. 
23  Ibid., 11–15. 
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considers only the violent actions of Hamas and cannot explain Hamas’ political 
activities. The conclusion, that Hamas is a purely militia organization, is misleading 
because the implication is that Hamas cannot be included in politics. His focus on Hamas 
as a religious sect neglects the fact that Hamas’ activities do not necessarily follow only 
religious considerations. 
A more detailed analysis is provided by Matthew Levitt. He provides a deeper 
analysis of Hamas as an organization. The study uncovers Hamas’ roots in “da’wa,” the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s aim to reshape society to an Islamic “mindset” by education and 
influence through social institutions. Levitt claims that Hamas’ charity institutions 
provide the basis for the terrorist activities, but provide no opportunity to initiate the 
moderation of Hamas.24 Although Levitt describes the split of Hamas’ leadership into 
two factions, the hardliners and the moderates, he argues that Hamas will adhere to its 
armed struggle.25 By his logic, Hamas’ complex organization is aimed only to cover and 
support its attacks against Israel. Hamas’ leaders are obliged to continue the armed 
combat.26 Hamas’ different social institutions and its political wing are used only to 
cover its terrorist activities.27 The social institutions provide the funding and the cover for 
the organization’s terrorist cells, whereas the political part of the organization grants 
legitimacy or position to provide terrorists with official functions and influence.28 The 
fact that Hamas won the 2006 elections must be understood in the context of the 
deteriorated situation in Palestine and as a protest against the PA, not as an attempt of 
Hamas to actively participate in politics.29 Levitt’s argument is that the hardliners will 
prevail in their adherence to violence. Similarly, Ambassador Ross supports the argument 
that “Hamas is bound to seek help from the international community to produce societal 
                                                 
24  Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, 39. 
25  Ibid., 49. 
26  Ibid., 1. 
27  Ibid., 5. 
28  Ibid., 6–7. 
29  Ibid., 6. 
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renewal even while it resists all efforts to get it to give up its principle of rejection of 
Israel and promotion of violence… Will it transform itself? Unlikely….”30 
Levitt’s and Ross’ arguments are typical of those that drive the current approach 
to the Middle East Peace Process. Hamas is defined as an obstacle, and the approach is 
the attempt to crack down on Hamas and neutralize it.31 Furthermore, Hamas is assessed 
as an organization that might gain the capabilities to “target the West” too.32 While this 
approach acknowledges that Hamas has a complex and heterogeneous structure, it does 
not take into consideration that Hamas’ decision-making process is also pragmatic under 
certain circumstances and does not necessarily lead to military or terrorist action. More 
than that, Levitt’s assessment does not take into account that Hamas’ course of action is 
interdependent of the PA and Fatah, which are assessed to be just as unable to employ 
governance.33 The isolation approach is increasing the hardship of the Palestinian 
citizens.34 Additionally, polls taken of the perception of Palestinians show that Hamas is 
not blamed.35 Therefore, it is questionable if an attempted crackdown of Hamas will lead 
to its neutralization, or bolster its reputation as a supporter of the Palestinians, while 
Israel and the international community are blamed as the aggressors. Such an approach 
will foster Hamas’ adherence to violence. 
The policy implication of this first school of thought is simple: Hamas cannot be 
reformed into a political party and will continue to use violence. Therefore, Hamas must 
be neutralized in order to achieve any progress in the peace process. Recent policy  
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followed this implication, both with the Quartet’s and Israel’s isolation attempt, and with 
Israel’s operation “Cast Lead.” Both attempts, neutralization by force or isolation, proved 
to be insufficient to deal with Hamas. 
A second school of thought reveals Hamas’ ability to learn and to develop new 
strategies.36 Hamas’ critical capacity to maintain a powerful position is based on public 
support. Throughout the course of events, Hamas has pursued its goals not only by 
violence. After its foundation in 1987, Hamas’ focus was the intifada. But, soon after, 
Hamas matured and separated from the MB and began to challenge the PLO in its 
superior positions in Palestine. When the PLO rejected violence and accepted the 
conditions of the Oslo Peace Accord in 1993, Hamas adhered to its original agenda and 
its struggle against Israel although it reduced its number of attacks and referred to them 
as defensive. The aim was to maintain and secure its own position in order to further 
compete with the PLO and especially with Fatah. Later, Hamas recognized the 
opportunities of political participation.37 This led to the foundation of a political party, 
the participation in elections, and compelled Hamas to assume political responsibility. 
During the course of events, Hamas continued to maintain its social institutions. This 
short depiction of the historic landmarks shows Hamas’ ability to adapt. Hamas uses 
participation, and negotiation, as well as violence to maintain its position.38 When 
necessary, Hamas uses violence, but also participates in politics if it helps the movement 
to succeed. Thereby, a split from its original agenda is accepted by the leadership. 
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Studies that analyze Hamas’ actions after the 2006 elections prove this 
“willingness to change”39 along with a change in behavior from violent struggle focused 
against Israel towards political decision making. Hamas’ formation as an armed 
resistance movement followed historic developments.40 Thus, Hamas’ willingness to use 
violence is obvious, but meticulous analysis of the Hamas organization proves that it 
adapts to changing situations and is able to reform.41 Hamas thinks pragmatically and 
wants to maintain its position in Palestine. As Jeroen Gunning shows in his 2008 
analysis, Hamas uses violence to gain authority and sustain public support. Whenever the 
public supports violence, as during the first and second intifada, Hamas uses violence to 
support its aims because it can gain public support. Nonetheless, violence is not 
indispensable for Hamas’ actions.42 The developments between 2004 and 2008 prove that 
the use of violence depends on the circumstances.43 During both intifadas, Hamas’ 
radical agenda and its violence were the reasons for its popularity. However, the support 
for violence declined at the end of the second intifada and public support after the 
elections depended on Hamas’ ability to govern. Therefore, Hamas adapted and changed 
its behavior. Gunning’s assessment is supported by polls from 2008 that show public 
support for a peace process had increased and support for domestic violence had 
declined.44 
Shaul Mishal and Khaled Hroub explain in thorough detail that Hamas is much 
more than merely a terrorist organization.45 “The willingness…to take part in varying 
levels of state-controlled, limited democratic rule demonstrates the Islamists’ conviction 
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that they can gain influence and promote their objectives by operating within the existing 
political order. In this respect, Hamas…escaped a binary perception regarding their 
relations with their ideological rivals and political opponents.”46 
However, both studies also reveal Hamas’ difficulties to adapt its maximalist 
position to current developments. Hamas is always striving to maintain its position. 
Therefore, it uses its radical agenda, together with violence, whenever these promise to 
further expand its power and public support.47 But, Hamas is also able to adapt to new 
circumstances which can lead to nonviolent behavior. The problem for Hamas to adapt to 
such a position to a full extent is twofold. First, Hamas’ leadership is comprised of a 
hardliner faction that maintains the radical agenda and prefers violence, and the more 
moderate leaders, who are more willing to engage in political participation.48 This 
internal division and dispute about the course of action hampers an unambiguous 
position. Additionally, the maintenance of an armed wing must be seen from an inner 
Palestinian view. As long as Fatah and Hamas do not resolve their dispute, Hamas needs 
its armed wing to secure its position. Second, besides the maintenance of its position in 
Palestine, Hamas needs to preserve its identity as a resistance movement. This makes it 
difficult for Hamas to simply participate in politics which seems to be contrary to its 
objectives. 
The findings of the studies of Gunning, Hroub, Mishal and the others, show that 
the use of violence depends on: the gain for the maintenance of the organization’s power 
position in Palestine and the personal influence of the prevailing leadership, either the 
hardliners or the moderates, whoever dominates. Concerning the use of violence, Hamas 
differentiates between the use of force against Israel and its use in a domestic situation. A 
turn of Hamas towards pragmatic politics is not impossible. Hamas continuously adapts 
its politics to sustain the public support it needs to maintain its position in Palestine. 
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Hamas depends on public support, mostly from the middle class.49 Coping with public 
necessities requires Hamas to sustain that support. Polls also show that the support for 
violence is fluid in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.50 Therefore, Hamas’ approach has to 
cope with this public perception, too. The importance of the public perception of the 
middle class is fostered by Claude Berebi’s research that indicates most of Hamas’ 
personnel descend from the middle class and joined Hamas because terrorism was 
“popular.”51 If the popularity of terrorism is declining, then Hamas will be compelled to 
change because, as a political party, it must cope with public opinion and necessities. 
This pattern can also be observed with other terrorist organizations like the IRA.52 
Taking these facts into consideration, the 2008 clashes between Hamas and Fatah can be 
assessed as an attempt to maintain the position gained in the elections. Violence was used 
because it was assessed as the best tool to reach that aim. This indicates that Hamas may 
resort to more pragmatic means if these pragmatic politics show success. The attempt to 
form a united government after the 2006 elections and the fragile truce from June until 
December were indicators. Additionally, post-election analysis proves that inner 
Palestinian cooperation and progress is possible. This chance was muted by the failing 
approach of the international community.53 The last consequence of the international 
community’s isolation led to repeated inner Palestinian violence and escalation in 
December 2008. The fact that Hamas’ policies during the truce and isolation showed little 
or no success gave Hamas no incentive to refer to non-violent means. Moreover, it left 
the hardliner leadership in charge with the assessment that they could benefit more from a 
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military escalation than from declining public support of its governance.54 Hamas hopes 
to take advantage of public opinion that turns against perceived Israeli aggression and can 
improve its status if it withstands the Israeli operation.55 The demand of recent analyses 
for a new approach toward dialogue with and the integration of Hamas remain valid.56 
The second school of thought assesses Hamas as an organization that can learn to 
refrain from violence. Indeed, studies like Gunning’s or Mishal’s show how Hamas 
changed its behavior through the course of events. The policy implication of this position 
is that Hamas’ inclusion in politics will further support the process of moderation of 
Hamas into a non-violent organization. Nonetheless, like the first school of thought, 
which focuses only on Hamas’ militant activities, the second school of thought focuses 
too much on Hamas’ political development. It neglects the fact that Hamas is using non-
violence as well as violent means in varying and changing ways. In the period from 2004 
to 2008 Hamas never completely stopped its rocket attacks. A decline in violence must 
also be understood in the context of successful Israeli offensive and defensive 
countermeasures. Mere inclusion in politics is no guarantee that Hamas will completely 
refrain from violence. 
This thesis asserts a middle position. Hamas’ decisions to act depend on two 
factors. First, its internal situation and the leadership faction that dominates are of 
importance. Second, and even more important, the political and situational circumstances 
on the ground in Palestine have a strong impact on Hamas’ decision to act. Hamas’ use of 
violent or non-violent means is a response to the circumstances. The middle position 
implies that the conditions on the ground can be influenced, that the situation on the 
ground gives Hamas little or no incentive to use violence. The modalities of engagement  
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do not only include Hamas in politics with talks, but also the shaping of the political 
environment in a way that would allow Hamas to redefine its resistant character or to 
accept the political conditions. 
D. METHOD AND SOURCES 
In this thesis, Hamas’ history is divided into key phases that are treated as cases. 
Each case will be explored regarding how the political context and internal organizational 
debates shaped Hamas’ strategy. The goal is to assess if Hamas was driven by ideology 
alone or pragmatism. The analysis will include basic literature about social movement 
theory as well as studies based on collected and analyzed data about Hamas and the 
Middle East. The cited studies only partially cover the ongoing events as the Israeli-
Palestine conflict is developing. Due to that fact, further sources have to include the latest 
articles in scholarly journals, such as the Journal of Palestine Studies, or the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policies. Furthermore, sources have to include surveys of the 
current situation, such as regular reports of the International Crisis Group or the 
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. Due to the topicality of the research 
question, the permanent survey has to include newspapers, too. 
E.  THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis approach. Chapter II analyzes 
Hamas’ origins as a social movement and examines Hamas’ organizational structure and 
its leadership. It is important to understand Hamas’ roots and structure because it explains 
the ongoing process of Hamas’ evolution. Like any social movement, Hamas reacts to 
political opportunities and is undergoing changes in its structure, goals, and aims. To 
understand Hamas’ character as a social movement, it is necessary to understand how 
Hamas acts while maintaining its agenda. This background is important because it 
defines the way Hamas acts. The dichotomy between the ideological charter and the 
political practice of Hamas must be understood. While the ideological charter remains 
unchanged and calls for the annihilation of Israel, the political practice has been to pursue 
a long term strategy accepting a long lasting truce with Israel—which at least means 
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accepting the Israeli nation-state. This dichotomy between charter and practice is known. 
The different factions in Hamas are either trying to moderate this dichotomy or simply 
ignore this fact. This thinking and acting is important because it influences Hamas’ 
decisions on how to proceed in Palestine. Furthermore, the understanding of the charter is 
important because its contents hinder Hamas from transforming itself completely. If 
Hamas were to accept Israel, Hamas would, in fact, give up its identity. This limits 
Hamas in its political scope, allowing only indirect acceptance. The organization’s 
different wings and their leadership are interdependent of the ideology and its origins. As 
described, the leadership is divided into hardliners, more willing to refer to violence, and 
moderates, more willing to engage in politics. Depending upon which faction can gain 
dominance by exploitation of the situation, the course of action towards violence or 
pragmatic politics is influenced. The analysis has to include the different parts of the 
organization. The understanding of the organizational behavior is important because it 
helps to explain the impacts of external influences and the strategy Hamas has been 
following since the 2006 elections. 
As mentioned, Hamas reacts to external influences because it has situational 
awareness. These circumstances have a strong impact on the dominating leadership 
faction and the selected course of action. Chapter III will examine Hamas’ political 
practice by the use of six case studies.  Hamas’ decisions always reflect analysis of the 
current situation. This includes competition with Fatah for power. Both sides are trying to 
secure their positions in order to be in a favorable position to continue negotiations with 
each other. This chapter will combine the findings of the previous chapters. It will 
illustrate Hamas decision making and the tensions between ideology and the need for 
pragmatic politics, and how Hamas is balancing these two poles. By using the case 
examples, this chapter will show Hamas moving between violence and pragmatic 
politics. 
Chapter IV will reach a conclusion. It will draw implications from the findings of 
the thesis. It will describe possible approaches to the situation in the Middle East and the 
peace process. 
 18
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II. HAMAS’ CHARACTER AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
Hamas developed as a social movement and built up its own structure and 
hierarchy. This influences its development and transformation as well as its actions today 
as a political power. Understanding Hamas’ origins, and structure and how they influence 
decision making within Hamas is essential to understanding Hamas’ contemporary 
positions, decisions and actions. 
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT DEVELOPMENT 
What are social movements? This analysis will refer to the following definition: A 
social movement is “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social 
solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities.”57 Hamas is 
an Islamist movement. To further specify the term Islamist, another definition must be 
added: “By Islamist I mean individuals, groups, organizations, and parties that see in 
Islam a guiding political doctrine that justifies and motivates collective action on behalf 
of that doctrine.”58 
To become a movement, an organization must meet some requirements and 
prerequisites. There are several common requirements for a movement to develop and 
survive. Social movement is sustained contentious action. In order to achieve 
mobilization it needs other processes. In general, one can identify three processes: 
“political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes.”59 Mobilization 
occurs because people need a reason, a cause to mobilize and engage in actions against an 
opponent or a situation. In general, the trigger for such a cause is a change in an existing 
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society and political system.60 In the Middle East, the model of Arab nationalism was not 
able to fulfill the expectations of the population, especially of the middle class.61 This led 
to grievances and perceived deprivation. Nonetheless, change in society alone is not 
capable of explaining the emergence of movements. Mohammed M. Hafez shows that 
grievances only are not a cause for Islamist movements.62 It can be said that grievances 
are the initiator. But, to successfully create a social movement, the initiator must be 
transformed into successful mobilization in the face of political opportunities.63  
Political opportunities develop due to change in a situation. They can be described 
as an incentive to act in order to change one’s situation.64 The source of political 
opportunities can vary. It can be that the situation changes and opens up an opportunity to 
improve one’s own situation, or that the situation on the ground is perceived as bad and 
an organization presents an opportunity for change to good.65 In the case of the 
development of Hamas, the opportunity was opened by Israel, when it allowed the MB to 
compete with the PLO, and in the first intifada. 
Mobilizing structures are necessary and used to bring people together to engage in 
collective action.66 Like political opportunities, they can vary and fulfill different tasks. 
As Hafez describes,67 mobilizing structures are needed to provide a space to assemble 
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and the necessary funding, the “material and organizational resources.” Additionally, 
movements must be accepted by the public and perceived to provide a solution for a 
common cause in an appropriate way. They must be perceived as legitimate. These are 
the “legitimacy and identity resources.” In order to achieve the movement’s objective, a 
movement needs an institutional structure to carry its message, the “institutional 
resource.” Concerning the “material and organizational resources,” movements develop 
their own hierarchies and structures.  
The last requirement for a successful mobilization of a movement is the frame to 
this message. Like the other requirements, frames depend on the situational 
circumstances and cultural backgrounds. A successful frame presents the movement’s 
message in a way that a large part of a society can identify with.68 Therefore, it has to use 
symbols that are known and understood in the society. The frame expresses the ideology 
of the movement. If the “legitimacy and identity resources” are the vehicle, the frame 
puts the message into the “flavor of the day.” An example for a successful framing is 
provided by Ziad Munson in his analysis of the Egyptian MB;  
There was a concrete relationship between Muslim Brotherhood ideas and 
the everyday lives of the Egyptians. The organization provided new 
members with a message that they could apply immediately to their daily 
lives, by abstaining from alcohol, withdrawing money from interest-
bearing accounts, and so on. The ideology connected these small details 
with the larger ideal of building a better society and better life. The 
richness of the Islamic message connected to many facets of an 
individual’s life, providing each with a stronger identification with and 
commitment to the organization.69  
This example shows that a frame is successful when it resonates with people’s 
experience. It is important to understand that the frame alone does not mobilize a 
movement but does act as a “supporting device.” 
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How did the formation of a movement work for Hamas? How did Hamas 
develop? How is Hamas structured? 
B. FORMATION 
Hamas is the product of three factors: First, the activities of the Palestinian MB. 
The second factor was the acceleration of events with the Palestinian uprising in 1987, 
the first intifada. The third factor was the failure of the PLO to achieve its objectives of 
achieving a state for the Palestinian people. 
Hamas’ development must be seen within the context of the Palestinian situation 
at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. The foundation of Hamas marked the end of 
internal discussions and tensions in the MB, which had started before the outbreak of the 
first intifada. After the Arab defeat in the Six Day War of 1976, the MB was the 
dominant Islamic movement in Palestine,70 where, in the war’s aftermath, the MB 
developed an institutional and organizational infrastructure. The most important step was 
the creation of the Mujamma, the Islamic Center.71 The Mujamma was the base for the 
MB’s institutionalization in Palestine. It combined social activities, such as sports, with 
charity, social services and the MB’s message.72 As in Egypt, it worked on the communal 
level and inserted the MB into daily life. It provided the necessary mobilizing structures 
and the framing of MB’s message. Thereby, the Palestinian MB developed a sustainable 
and enduring organizational structure, which allowed its influence to spread. In the late 
1970s, the MB had spread throughout Palestine and had consolidated with its West Bank 
chapter73 when the growth of Islamic movements accelerated. One reason for that was 
the success of the Iranian revolution, and the response to the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan, which also boosted the popularity of more militant Islam activism against 
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Westernized regimes and occupation.74 This is important because it influenced the MB’s 
members later on. Another important development that favored the growth of Islamic 
movements was the situation in Palestine itself. The combination of a tense economic 
situation on the Arab peninsula, Israeli constraints, growing inflation, and rising 
unemployment led to deterioration of the social and economic conditions in Palestine.75 
Nonetheless, this situation presented an opportunity for the MB to further spread and gain 
influence because its course presented a viable alternative. “Spurred by these 
developments and encouraged by its growing popularity, the Mujamma leadership moved 
to penetrate the public sphere, hitherto dominated by the PLO.”76 The Mujamma 
successfully gained influence in professional associations, and most importantly among 
the students. First, the MB gained influence mainly by funding the Islamic University in 
Gaza at the same time the PLO’s financial contribution decreased. The number of MB 
representatives at the university steadily increased and, in 1983, the MB won the power 
struggle against the PLO.77 The growing number of students in the ranks of the MB 
initiated a generational change in the movement. The contemporary leadership had 
consisted of “urban, upper middle-class merchants.”78 These leaders were settled and 
tended to be non-revolutionary. Therefore, they adhered to the MB strategy of “bottom-
up social Islamization.”79 In contrast to that, the new student membership from the 
universities represented the lower middle class from rural areas. Moreover, these students 
brought different experiences into the movement. They came from rural areas and 
refugee camps, where the secular nationalists, like the PLO, had strong influence. 
Consequently, these younger members were more open to the use of violence than the 
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older generation.80 This coincided with the increasing radicalization of the situation in 
Palestine. Not only did the situation between Israelis and Palestinians become more 
violent, the competition between the different Palestinian groups became more violent.81 
After penetration into the political sphere, the MB found itself in competition with other 
groups, foremost the PLO and Fatah,82 and with the competing ideology of nationalism. 
The new members, the growing Islamization, and the radicalization of the situation 
brought the two ideologies, Islamization and nationalism together within the MB and 
initiated the internal discussion about the strategy. Robinson shows “that the Islamist 
movement began to divide along class and ideological lines in the 1980s, a fissure that 
pitted the old elite of the Muslim Brotherhood against an active middle stratum.”83 A first 
result of this fissure was the offshoot of the Islamic Jihad in the early 1980s. It was 
founded by MB leaders who rejected the passive approach of the MB and wanted to fight 
against Israeli occupation.84 This new movement gained popularity. One can say that 
Islamic Jihad successfully used an opportunity and successfully framed its cause, 
showing that active resistance and Islamization could be synchronized.85 The MB needed 
to respond in order to maintain its position. Another indicator for a shift in the MB’s 
strategy was the attempt by Sheik Yassin to found the first core of a security apparatus, 
the Majd.86 
These circumstances set the stage for the foundation of Hamas. While trying to 
exploit opportunities, the MB had to compete with different internal and external groups  
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and ideologies, secular and religious, and to cope with a changing, radicalizing situation 
in order to survive. The MB found itself in a spiral of events in which each response and 
event accelerated further events. 
Yet, the political environment changed in favor of the MB. The PLO was 
weakened by its expulsion from Lebanon and the Israeli decision to crack down on the 
PLO but to stay neutral towards the MB.87 This allowed the MB to spread in the public 
and political sphere as described and to fill “the vacancy.” Furthermore, this series of 
events was crucial for the MB to exploit the momentum of the increased popularity of 
Islamization because it was not hampered or constrained in its actions whereas the PLO 
was handicapped.88 The society changed its view of Islam over the course of events. It 
was open for the combination of Islamism and the cause of a Palestinian nation. 
There is another implication in the context of this political opportunity. As 
explained, the younger generation in the MB was more radicalized and willing to 
participate in armed struggle, thereby combining the Islamic cause of the MB with the 
ideology of a Palestinian nation.89 Due to that, entering into the political sphere was not 
only an opportunity but also a necessity in order to cope with the MB’s  internal debate. 
The popularity of Islamic movements and international developments, along with 
the MB’s established organization in Palestine presented an Islamic solution for the 
Palestinian cause.90 Nonetheless, the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity was connected 
with a nationalist cause and active resistance against the occupation. The formation of the 
Islamic Jihad is a good example. To exploit its popularity as an Islamist movement, the 
MB had to present its course of action as an available Islamic solution under the given 
situation.  
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Another opportunity for the MB was the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. 
The spontaneous riots that merged into the first intifada, and included more or less the 
whole Palestinian entity, caught the MB by surprise. Due to the dominant public support 
for violence, adherence to an unarmed struggle only was no longer an alternative for the 
MB to sustain its position. Furthermore, the Intifada could have enabled the PLO to 
regain ground and power.91 The MB had to decide how to participate in the uprising, 
which was vital to sustain support, while at the same time to not compromise the 
movement. In the face of the new situation, the Muslim Brotherhood argued that “it was 
possible and necessary to try to achieve them (social change and freedom for the 
Palestinian land) simultaneously, and not to delay one for the sake of the other, on the 
grounds that objective circumstances determine the timing.”92 With the creation of 
Hamas, the MB was able to cope with the new situation and respond to the pressure of its 
younger, militant leadership. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted jihad, 
compromising between social Islamization and jihad, and secured its survival.93 The 
establishment of Hamas, as an independent organization, allowed the MB to maintain its 
character and position against the PLO while at the same time participating in and 
contributing to the intifada.94 Moreover, it allowed the MB to continue its “daily 
business” without being the target of Israeli countermeasures because the MB itself did 
not commit violence. Robinson describes the formation of Hamas as a revolution “of the 
activist second stratum of the Muslim Brotherhood against the more reform-minded first 
stratum.”95 The formation of Hamas was not quite a revolt. But what is obvious is that 
the center of gravity in the MB shifted from the older to the younger leadership who were 
the driving factor in the formation of Hamas and therefore in the change of the MB’s 
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strategy due to political opportunities.96 The decision to create Hamas showed that the 
MB leadership responded to external and internal opportunities and constraints it was not 
able to control. Hamas developed as a flank effect to the MB because of the influence of 
the situation and the internal pressure of the hardliners. Favored by the circumstances of 
the intifada, it matured quickly and subsumed its mother-organization, thereby integrating 
the welfare network.97 Thus, the “exogenous event (the start of the intifada) led to the 
birth and empowerment of a new SMO (Social Movement Organization).”98 
C. HAMAS’ MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 
As a movement, Hamas has to mobilize its supporters. What are the structures 
Hamas has mobilized on and is mobilizing with? The answer to that question lies with 
Hamas’ roots in the Mujamma. In its process of maturation, Hamas subsumed the MB’s 
charity organizations and with them the existing network. The mosques are another 
factor. The charity organizations and social services, as well as the mosques, provide 
Hamas with the necessary structure to mobilize its supporters. As in Egypt, these 
organizations were structured on the communal level. Additionally, the decade before the 
intifada can be described as “the mosque building phase” with a significant increase in 
the number of mosques in the Gaza Strip.99 The Mujamma combined the mosques with 
its other services like schools, sport clubs, and medical installations.100 As in Egypt, this 
allowed a combination of the cause and solution together with daily Palestinian life. The 
combination allowed the successful transportation of the message together with practical 
daily life solutions for the people. When Hamas took over, it maintained these 
organizations, thereby keeping a structure to which it could win new members.101 Hamas 
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added its cause for armed resistance, thereby combining it with the legitimacy of the 
established institutions. Although these institutions are one base on which to mobilize 
supporters, a charity organization does not inevitably create new members. As Gunning 
shows, the advisory boards of the charity organizations also include nonmembers. The 
charity organizations are a means to combine message with daily matters, whereas other 
institutions such as student organizations win the main base of supporters. Two more 
facts are important. First, because these structures are based at the communal level they 
also help to develop personal networks. These personal networks are another important 
mobilizing structure. As a matter of fact, the combination of message, institution, 
networks, and practical help in daily matters, provided the structure to win members for 
the movement. Second, Hamas not only maintained the old institutions but also 
established new ones. During the Oslo period, it founded the Scientifical Medical 
Association and the Hamas’ Association for Science and Culture.102 This added 
education to the structure and provided influence at an early stage, which contributed to 
mobilization, too.103 Besides the community level, the adaptation of the Mujamma’s 
institutions provided Hamas with mobilizing structures on the national level. Because the 
Mujamma gained supreme influence in the universities, Hamas was able to link to the 
students, who were most open to its cause, as explained.104 The backgrounds of the 
students made them very receptive to Hamas’ message and the opportunities it offered in 
its activities. That its student blocs were the most important mobilizing structure is shown 
in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. While the political environment was dominated by 
Fatah and the PA, Hamas maintained significant influence and support among 
students.105 
In order to survive, Hamas not only needed to maintain the mobilizing structures 
it had taken over from its predecessor, but also establish its own enduring hierarchy and 
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institutional base. Soon after its formation, the senior leaders were imprisoned or 
deported.106 Together, with the fact that Hamas’ formation was not thoroughly planned, 
these facts demanded a restructuring of the movement. In order to avoid neutralization by 
further crackdowns, the organization was separated into social, militant, and political 
wings.107 Furthermore, the leadership divided into an internal leadership and an external 
leadership. Initially this structure was created to provide uninterrupted leadership in case 
of crackdowns.108 As the different mobilizing structures show, Hamas organized itself 
into a heterogenic structure. This allowed Hamas to successfully address a large part of 
the population during the intifada and gain further power.109 Furthermore, Hamas formed 
an enduring organization with secured funding. This created tensions between the 
different parts of the organization, especially between the external and the militant 
leadership who can be assessed as the hardliners, on the one side, and the internal 
leadership who can be considered as more moderate, on the other side.110  
The mobilizing structures and its organization enabled Hamas to survive 
repression and challenges. Even in the unfavorable conditions of the Oslo period, when 
Hamas was threatened by marginalization and containment by its opponents, Hamas 
managed to maintain its structures and organization. When the outbreak of the al-Aqsa 
intifada changed the conditions in favor of Hamas, it was able to reach back to an 
established structure and organization. Moreover, Hamas continues to work on its 
mobilizing structures. While rejecting participation in the 1995 elections, Hamas later 
formed the Islamic Salvation Party and participated successfully in the 2006 elections. 
Although the party did not win an absolute majority or provide a major increase in 
members for Hamas, it proved to be a viable mobilizing structure under the given 
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circumstances.111 The situation changed after the elections. While Hamas has to prove its 
ability to govern, it has to maintain the movement’s cohesion. Therefore, it is trying to 
incorporate itself into the administrative structure in the Gaza Strip while at the same 
time maintaining the movement’s political position.112 Figure 1 shows Hamas’ current 
structure. 
 
Figure 1: Hamas’ Structure113 
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D.  CULTURAL FRAMING AND HAMAS’ CHARTER 
Like other movements, Hamas is using a frame, which can be called its public 
relations-stance, the movement’s package. 
Soon after its formation, Hamas published its Charter in 1988.114 It presented the 
identity and ideology of Hamas. Moreover, it combined the MB’s social Islamization 
with Hamas’ armed resistance and its participation in politics. It legitimized violence and 
combined Hamas’ course of action with public opinion and perception. This was crucial 
because in order to gain and maintain public support a movement’s message must 
“resonate with its target audience.”115 The Charter positioned Hamas into political 
circumstances. Article 2 of Hamas’ Charter defines Hamas as a part of the Palestinian 
MB.116As explained, Hamas developed as a flank effect as a result of inner pressure and 
situational adaptation. It was necessary to combine MB ideology and legitimacy with a 
legitimized participation in the intifada and the Palestinian cause.117 Article 9 shows that 
Hamas adapted the MB’s definition of the Islamic crisis and built a bridge to connect this 
crisis and its Islamic solution to the Palestinian national cause and, in the end, to the use 
of violence. Nonetheless, article 10 shows that Hamas was founded as an independent 
organization.118 These facts are important in the later course of events. While the link to 
the MB allowed Hamas to subsume the MB’s foundations in Palestine, the definition as 
an independent movement allowed the group’s maturation without any frictions within its 
message. How does the connection of the causes work? 
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The foundation of the Charter, which is based on Islam, article 6 and 8 show it is 
pivotal to the connection.119 The adherence to the Islamic cause, as depicted in article 5 
of the Charter orients Hamas’ objectives and strategy ultimately to the Islamic frame.120 
Therefore, Hamas’ cause is indispensably connected with Islam and one issue for every 
Muslim. Additionally, the Islamic base allows for the concept of Islamic nationalism. 
First of all, in article 11, Palestine is declared as a “waqf,” an endowment given to the 
Muslims by god. This Islamic definition of the Palestinian entity has two effects. First, it 
gives the Islamic entity of Palestine a fact of sovereignty.121 This gives the national cause 
its religious dimension and solves “the contradiction between the national idea…and the 
divine law….”122 Thus Hamas and its activities provide an embracing solution. Article 
12 stresses this connection and merges the concept of a Palestinian national state together 
with the Islamic cause.123 With this, Hamas has been able to offer an authentic 
nationalism that presents an identity every Palestinian can cope with.124 Second, the 
definition of Palestine as part of an Islamic heritage allows legitimizing Hamas’ violence 
in the name of jihad. Moreover, it combines the cause of jihad with the Islamization of 
Palestine.125 It is important to see the connection between the definition of the Islamic 
nation and legitimate jihad. Because Palestine, as a sovereign Islamic entity, has been 
“invaded,” this allows the right for a defensive jihad, which in turn then is a duty for 
every Muslim.126 Thereby, Hamas has had to cope with a divergence between its rocket 
and suicide attacks against Israeli civilians and the classical interpretation of jihad, which 
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rejects violence against non-combatants.127 Hamas’ Charter itself emphasizes jihad as 
“the only way” without reference to the conduct of that jihad. In an interview, a Hamas 
leader of the political bureau legitimized the attacks against non-combatants because 
“unfortunately most of Israeli society is armed and militarized.”128 By defining the Israeli 
entity as a military one and therefore a legitimate target, Hamas put itself back in line 
with its Charter. The embracing construction of the Charter provided a base for a cultural 
frame that successfully combined different Palestinian concerns, the end of Israeli 
occupation, a stable society and sovereignty, with strong symbols, a defensive jihad, and 
an Islamic heritage. It connected all aspects of perceived oppression, common identity 
and religion.129 Given the circumstances of the first intifada, this frame successfully 
“resonated with the target audience.”130  
Nonetheless, the Charter also implies some difficulties for Hamas. The 
movement’s identity is bound to jihad and its Islamist nationalistic legitimization. In 
contrast to that, Hamas’ political practice also includes pragmatism and deviates from the 
Charter, as the case studies in chapter III will show.131 The Charter proved to be a 
successful frame for entering the public and political sphere during the intifada. With the 
beginning of the Oslo period, the movement experienced the first difficulties in the unity 
of ideology and practice. Therefore, it had to move to a more moderate position using 
“normal” political frames to transport its message.132 The need to use different frames 
which did not necessarily deal with the ideological identity was even more obvious in the 
2006 elections and the aftermath. In the elections, Hamas campaigned with political 
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issues.133 Once in power, Hamas tried to maintain its “1987 intifada identity” while at the 
same time secure public support and present itself as a capable government and 
opposition to the PA and Fatah. While there is an obvious divergence between its Charter 
and the actions necessary to secure the movement’s survival, Hamas applied flexible 
politics as frames in order to ensure its cohesion and public support. What can be seen 
also from the Hamas Charter and use of frames is the use of Islam as an embracive factor. 
Its importance lies with its use as a cultural frame rather than as the driving factor behind 
decision making as Chapter III will show.134 
E. HAMAS’ ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: THE ORGANIZATION 
As explained, Hamas’ organizational structure grew when Hamas matured. The 
structure, as shown in Figure 1, allows the organization to conduct clandestine militant 
operations, as well as to participate in politics. It consists of: the charity or social welfare 
institutions, the political apparatus and the security and military apparatus.135 At first 
glance, the structure seems to support ordered decision making and even allow 
participation in a democratic sense. Decisions are made in committees at the different 
echelons and members, as well as leaders, are elected.136 Moreover, the charity 
leadership of the charity organizations also includes individuals who are not members of 
Hamas.137 The latest adaptation was the formation of the Change and Reform Party. 
Nonetheless, the decision making strongly depends on the kind of leadership. 
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The heterogeneous structure of Hamas shows that it is capable of conducting 
politics in a multifaceted way. While the charity organizations link Hamas with the daily 
life of the Palestinians, the student organization and the political party allow permanent 
participation in politics. Although the link to Palestinian daily life is not a guarantee for 
public support, it proves that Hamas is a persistent factor in Palestinian society. As polls 
show, the support for Hamas declined from 2006 to 2008, but never faded away.138 An 
example was the decreased support for Hamas in general, but the increased support for 
the Haniyeh government in 2008.139 Like the charity organizations, the political arms of 
the organization are persistent, too. The political bureau is based in Syria, therefore 
ensuring leadership in case of crackdowns, as Hamas experienced them in the intifadas or 
lately in the Israeli operation “Cast Lead.”140 Another example is the student unions and 
the Change and Reform Party. While the student unions stayed under Hamas’ dominance, 
even in the unfavorable Oslo Accord period, the Gaza government formed by the Change 
and Reform Party managed to withstand the isolation forced upon it and even to establish 
public order.141 Furthermore, the Shura Councils allow direction and guidance for 
members throughout all Palestine. Moreover, Hamas’ military arm further developed its 
structure. The Qassam-Brigades were restructured and adapted to the situation in Gaza. 
While still capable of operating in clandestine cells, the Brigades now have a paramilitary 
structure, clear hierarchy, ranks and defined areal responsibility. Additionally, the Gaza 
                                                 
138  Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll no. 29. 
139  Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll no. 30," 
Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2008/p30e.html#head1 (accessed January 12, 2009). 
140  Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, 40. 
141  Robinson, Hamas as Social Movement Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 
129; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Local Universities Students' Poll: The Peace 
Process and the Palestinian Domestic Situation: A Bleak Picture?" Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 
Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/96/university.html (accessed January 12, 2009); 
International Crisis Group, Middle East Report no. 71: Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families 
(Gaza, Jerusalem, Brussels: International Crisis Group [2007]), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_africa/arab_israeli_conflict/71_inside_
gaza___the_challenge_of_clans_and_families.pdf (accessed September 19 2008), 17; International Crisis 
Group, Middle East Briefing no. 24: Round Two in Gaza, 7; International Crisis Group, Middle East 
Briefing no. 26: Ending the War in Gaza, 6, 8. 
 36
police forces were integrated into the organization’s security apparatus.142 Two facts are 
of importance. First, the structure of Hamas allows political flexibility. As the events 
after Hamas’ election victory in 2006 up to the escalation of operation “Cast Lead” in 
2008 show, the organizational structure allows an adaptation of actions to circumstances. 
Second, while becoming a political factor, Hamas maintained its capabilities in the 
charity sector as well as in the militant sector. Furthermore, the separation of the 
leadership not only ensures undisruptive movement but also funding, which is 
independent from the situation on the ground in Palestine.143 These facts contribute to the 
organization’s sustainability.  
The structure is a product of Hamas’ history and experience. While the structure 
supports Hamas’ policy decisions towards violence and are pragmatic, decision making 
itself is strongly influenced by two factions in the leadership already mentioned: the 
hardliners and the moderates. 
F. HAMAS’ ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: THE LEADERSHIP 
The decision making in Hamas depends on two types of leaders within the Hamas 
hierarchy: the moderate leadership, and the hardliner leadership. Prior to the participation 
in the 2006 elections, the two types of leadership could have been divided by geography. 
The external leadership, together with the militia leaders, represented the hardliner 
faction, the internal leadership presented the more moderate faction. 
The external leadership, whose public expression is the 1992-formed political 
bureau headed today by Khaled Mishal, has control not only of the general political 
decision making and public relations, but also to some extent of the military wing,  which 
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is loyal, despite its independence, to the external leadership.144 Furthermore, it controls 
much of the funding which ensures it much influence.145 In contrast to that, the internal 
leadership has control of the institutions on the ground within Palestine.146 Due to the 
election system within Hamas, this is not a permanent situation. Influence and dominance 
in the decision-making bodies of Hamas can change from one leadership to the other, as 
will be discussed regarding Hamas’ political practice. 
What is even more important is the fact that the two leadership factions present 
two different approaches to Hamas’ politics. While the moderate leadership can be 
assessed as more open to cooperation and agreements, the hardliner leadership can be 
assessed as more restricted in its openness to talks and cooperation.147 The hardliner 
position does not necessarily imply total adherence to violence, but to the more 
aggressive pursuit of objectives and exploitations of opportunities, as seen in the events 
of 2007 and the first half of 2008. It is obvious that a dominance of hardliner leadership 
more likely leads to rejection of moderate behavior.148 These two different factions in the 
leadership are not limited to the decision-making bodies of Hamas, but also can be found 
in the different sub-organizations. While the factions could have been divided 
geographically, this changed after the decision to participate in the 2006 elections. Now 
the division between moderates and hardliners can be found throughout the 
organization.149 As the case studies in Chapter III will show, this does not necessarily 
lead to an internal “showdown” of the leadership factions, but creates tensions that 
influence Hamas’ decisions. The influence of the political leadership is twofold. The 
Hamas members, who were assigned to positions in the government after the elections, 
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have no position in the organization.150 Nonetheless, together with the moderates inside 
the organization, this political leadership has influence in the organization’s decision 
making.151 But, at the same time, this division in the leadership also fosters hardliner 
views within the organization, as well as the possibility the radical leaders of the armed 
faction can act on their own.152  
The two different leaderships inevitably lead to tension within Hamas.153 As the 
analysis of the center of gravity will show, the cohesion of the movement is of utmost 
importance for Hamas. Therefore, the decisions are normally made by consensus.154 But 
this consensus is influenced by the stance the particular leadership faction has at that 
time. Additionally, the personal influence of individual leaders is also of importance, as 
the examples of Sheik Yassin and Khaled Meshal show.155 As mentioned, the division in 
the leadership does not mean that hardliners always reject political solutions while 
moderates always reject violence. The level of violence used in response to opportunities 
indicates that actions which follow the decisions depend on the leadership which 
dominates in the respective situation. In the prelude to the escalation in December 2008, 
it seems that there was an intense discussion between hardliners and moderates when the 
truce came to an end.156 There are indicators that the moderates tried to revive the truce, 
but the likely dominance of the hardliners pointed towards escalation.157 Figure 2 shows 
a possible distribution of influence in the leadership in the end of 2008. 
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Figure 2: Hamas’ Hierarchy and Possible Leadership Influence at the end of 
2008 
It is important to keep these two positions in the overall Hamas leadership in mind 
when analyzing its politics. 
G. HAMAS’ ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: HAMAS’ CENTER OF 
GRAVITY 
By developing its structure and organization, Hamas also developed a center of 
gravity. Carl von Clausewitz defined it and it is defined today in NATO terms, as a 
“Centre of gravity: Characteristics, Capabilities or localities from which a nation, an 
alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical 
strength or will to fight.”158 The center of gravity explains why Hamas is able to 
influence the domestic politics and the Israel–Palestinian conflict. It is constituted of 
Hamas’ structure, organizational capabilities and its legitimacy. 
                                                 
158  NATO Standardization Agency, AAP 6: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 2002nd ed. 
(Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2001), 2-C-2. 
 40
This center of gravity is what keeps a movement operational. Therefore, a 
decision always refers to this center of gravity, either to protect it or to enforce it. As 
depicted in the definition, a center of gravity consists of capabilities, requirements, and 
also of vulnerabilities. 
Looking at Hamas, such a center of gravity can be found. Hamas has the ability of 
creating a strong impact on the Palestinian situation and to influence it. Figure 3 
illustrates Hamas’ center of gravity. Its organizational structure and political as well as 
military capabilities allow Hamas to pursue its objective with political and military 
means. This enabled Hamas to gain control of the Gaza Strip. This control is the critical 
capability that creates the impact on domestic politics and the Israel–Palestinian conflict. 
To maintain this capability requires cohesion, the sustained control of the Gaza Strip, the 
maintenance of the organization itself, the support, and contained opponents. These 
requirements are not always easy to maintain which creates some vulnerability. 
 
Figure 3: Hamas’ Center of Gravity 
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The existence of an organizational center of gravity shows two important facts. 
First, it shows the complexity of Hamas which indicates that it is a movement with 
political power rather than merely a group of terrorist activists. Second, the sustainment 
of such a center of gravity requires rational decision making, as will be explained in the 
next chapter. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of Hamas shows that it is a social movement rather than an extended 
terrorist organization and that Hamas responds to circumstances.  
Given the three elements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
cultural framing, Hamas complies with its characterization as a social movement. 
Although, at first, a flank effect of an existing and established movement, the Palestinian 
MB, Hamas developed its own momentum. Hamas began to respond independently to 
opportunities autarkic by its own ideology. The Charter, as well as the actions, shows this 
maturation process. As depicted and explained in more detail later, Hamas possesses a 
structured decision-making capability by which violence is applied after a cost-benefit 
analysis, and which distinguishes it from a solely radical group. Furthermore, Hamas was 
not only mobilized upon existing structures, it maintained and further developed these 
structures. Additionally, Hamas established a sustainable hierarchy and structure that, 
despite the internal tensions, maintained the movement’s survival throughout the course 
of events. Last, the movement successfully applied its ideology in a frame, which 
resonated with its target audience. Concerning these three elements of a social movement, 
Hamas fits the pattern. Nonetheless, the movement is further transforming. After the 
formation of the political party and the election victory, it had to adapt to the 
circumstances of being a government. This adaptation and framing is a challenge with a 
new quality for Hamas because it requires the solution of the tension between the inner 
factions as well as the divergence of the “1987 intifada identity” and the necessity to 
apply pragmatic politics as a government. The escalations in December 2008 until 
February 2009 seem to be a step backwards and do not fit into Hamas moderating. As 
will be shown later, and as recent analysis of the escalation around New Year 2009 
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indicates, Hamas’ behavior fits into the explained character indicating a decision-making 
process dominated by the hardliners. However, Hamas, as a movement, can be assessed 
to be successfully established. While the effects of military operations on Hamas are 
questionable, further analysis of Hamas shows that it is a political factor that has to be 
included in the peace process. 
Hamas’ decisions and actions are influenced by circumstances. This includes its 
structure, hierarchy and the center of gravity the organization developed. As an 
organization, Hamas wants to secure or improve its situation and prevent harm to itself. 
As an organization, Hamas developed the described center of gravity. It is the expression 
of what the organization wants and can do, and what it has to maintain in order to stay a 
political factor. As will be shown in the next chapter, the considerations of these internal 
circumstances are an indispensable factor in decision making. Furthermore, the different 
factions in the leadership present the “human factor” in decision making. Hamas’ course 
of action also depends on how the leadership assesses which opportunities to maintain, 
secure, or improve. Thereby, decision making is not carried out by one person. It is an 
interdependent process of situational circumstances, leadership assessment, and intra-
leadership discussion, influenced by the amount of control of the respective leadership 
and third party activities. The principle of consensus shows that while discussing and 
deciding about a course of action, the organization has a common understanding of its 
center of gravity and how to maintain it. 
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III.  HAMAS’ POLITICAL PRACTICE 
Hamas’ decision making follows a cost-benefit analysis that is influenced by its 
character as a movement and its organizational behavior. This chapter analyzes Hamas’ 
decision making in selected cases. These cases are: first, the 1987 uprising and the 
decision to form Hamas to compete with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Fatah; second, 
the Oslo Peace Accords 1993 and Hamas’ desire to sabotage a peace agreement that was 
accepted by the majority of Palestinians; third, the al-Aqsa uprising in 2000 after the 
failure of the peace accord between Barak and Arafat, and Hamas’ decision to participate 
with full force through the use of suicide attacks; fourth, the post-9/11 security 
environment giving Israel a good opportunity to crush Hamas and all violent Palestinian 
movements; fifth, the elections in 2006 and Hamas’ decision to participate and even hold 
a coalition government with Fatah; and sixth, finally the stalemate after the elections and 
Hamas’ decision to secure its position and the road to renewed escalation with Israel in 
the end of 2008. 
A. THE 1987 UPRISING AND THE DECISION TO FORM HAMAS 
Hamas developed out of an existing movement. Why did the Muslim Brotherhood 
leadership decide to form Hamas? To which incentives did they react? What were the 
opportunities? 
Chapter II depicted the development of the movement, of which three facts are 
especially important. First, the growing influence and the success in the public and 
political sphere brought the Mujamma in direct competition with other organizations, 
foremost the PLO, at that time the designated and sole Palestinian representative, and the 
MB’s old rival, Fatah, at that time the dominant power within the PLO.159 In the further 
course of events, this competition and struggle for dominance had a strong impact on 
decisions made by Hamas. Second, the growth of the Islamic movements emerged 
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simultaneously with a growing radicalization of the conflict with Israel due to worsening 
socioeconomic conditions.160 There were violent clashes between the competing 
movements, as well as the conflict with Israel. The idea of an armed struggle against 
Israel, defined as defensive jihad, became very popular.161 Additionally, the cause of a 
Palestinian nation won more and more supporters. As a result, members of the MB, 
dissatisfied with the teaching and preaching approach, split from the movement and 
formed the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.162 Islamic Jihad soon became another competitor of 
Hamas. At the same time, the MB spread and gained influence and power and had to 
cope with two facts: A growing demand for participation in the armed struggle from its 
own members, and a situation on the ground that presented a disadvantage for a social 
change approach and threatened to deprive the MB of its support.163 The third fact was 
the membership of the MB. With the spread in the public and political sphere, the types 
of members changed. The younger members, and the young leadership who emerged out 
of them, were more radicalized and open to the use of violence than the older 
leadership.164 The maturation of the movement’s second echelon, together with the 
growing popularity of jihad for the Palestinian cause, initiated a discussion about the 
MB’s strategy. What can be taken away from these three facts is that the MB found itself 
in an accelerating spiral of events. In order to survive, the MB had to cope with new 
ideologies, competitors and new kinds of members. 
The next step in the course of events was the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in 
1982. The PLO was assessed to be defeated. This led the MB leadership to assume that it 
could exploit the situation, which resulted in the first shift in strategy towards 
participation in the armed struggle. Within the Mujamma, Sheik Yassin founded the first 
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core of a security apparatus, the Majd.165 Nonetheless, this apparatus had a very limited 
task and was not sufficient to resolve the internal discussion or to cope with the next 
escalation of events. The first intifada caught the MB by surprise. Due to the dominant 
public support for violence, the MB’s adherence to an unarmed struggle was no longer an 
alternative for sustaining support.166 Additionally, the intifada could have presented an 
opportunity for the PLO to regain its former position. The MB had to decide how to 
participate in the uprising, which was vital to sustain its support, while at the same time 
not compromise the organization. In the face of the new situation, the MB tried to 
synchronize and legitimize the combination of the fight for the nation and 
Islamization.167 With the founding of Hamas, the MB adopted jihad and secured the 
group’s survival.168 It shows a pattern that can be seen also in later decisions made by 
Hamas whose decisions and actions always try to maneuver between identity and coping 
with conditions on the ground. The decision to form Hamas was aimed at maintaining the 
MB’s character and counter position against the PLO while simultaneously participating 
in the intifada without exposing the MB to Israeli countermeasures.169 The MB 
leadership responded to external and internal influences it was not able to control. The 
aim was to secure the movement’s survival. Ironically, the MB’s means for survival, 
Hamas, soon after subsumed its mother movement. 
Five facts stand out from this example. First, the MB responded not by 
coincidence but to the situational changes after an assessment of options. The foundation 
of Hamas was necessary to secure the survival of the MB. This meant securing the 
necessary public support by participating in the uprising and following the perception of 
the movement’s members and supporters.170 Second, the foundation of Hamas was a 
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quick response rather than a long planned adaptation to the situation.171 The eruption of 
violence was not foreseen but initiated a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.172 
The public support for active resistance required a response from the MB if it wanted to 
sustain its position in Palestine. The formation of Hamas allowed the MB to respond 
quickly without a lengthy transformation of the movement while at the same time to 
adopt the necessary “jihad now” policy of the intifada.173 Due to that, as a third fact, the 
foundation of Hamas marked a strategy shift from Islamization by education to Islamic 
nationalism.174 Nonetheless, the formation followed decision making based on the 
assessment of the situation and options. While the outbreak of the intifada came as a 
surprise, the MB already had contributed from the Israeli attempt to use the MB to 
contain the PLO.175 The MB had already exploited the opportunity to organize and 
expand in order to compete against the PLO. The outbreak of the intifada and the 
possibility of participation was not only a necessity; it offered an additional opportunity 
to compete against the PLO.176  Therefore, as a fourth fact, the MB had to sustain the 
organization in order to compete with other movements, foremost Fatah, the PLO, and 
Islamic Jihad. Due to that, Hamas was founded as a means to succeed in the 
competition.177 As the course of events shows, success in the challenge against its 
competitors was an important objective for Hamas. Last, as a fifth fact, the foundation of 
Hamas was also the result of the internal changes in the MB. The growing second 
generation in the MB, foremost students, was more open to purse the Palestinian cause 
with active resistance.178 This emergence of a second generation of MB members and 
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leaders with a new approach to the Palestinian cause required an examination of the 
MB’s position.179 The outbreak of the intifada allowed this second generation to 
influence the adaptation of the MB to active participation in the intifada.180 
Hamas was founded to participate in the intifada. After its formation, Hamas’ 
organizational structure developed and Hamas became operational.181 Soon it subsumed 
the MB and developed its own ideology as the charter of 1988 shows. As explained, jihad 
is the core of its identity. Therefore, the Oslo Peace Accords, analyzed in the next case, 
meant a major blow to Hamas. Hamas did not respond by coincidence, but by situational 
awareness and pragmatic decision making. As will be shown, Hamas’ “jihad identity” did 
not stop them from acting rationally and refraining from violence if necessary rather than 
blindly following its charter and using violence without assessing the consequences, even 
if these actions did not match the group’s core identity. 
B. THE OSLO PEACE ACCORDS 
In the beginning of the 1990s, Hamas expanded. Although the public support for 
Hamas barely exceeded 20 percent, its militant actions against Israel were supported. 
Hamas managed to sustain its support.182 With the organizational foundation of the al-
Qassam battalions, it finally left the clandestine sphere.183 While Hamas increased its 
attacks, it took care to maintain its support by the public and the legitimacy of its actions 
as defensive jihad.184 Therefore, the intifada was favorable to the membership because it 
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legitimized violence in general. In contrast, the Oslo Peace Accord of 1993, and its 
results, threatened Hamas in its very existence. Public opinion swung towards peace, 
thereby favoring Fatah and the PLO.185 This decline in public support of violence 
threatened Hamas’ base of support. Hamas, formed as a resistance movement, was bound 
to violence. More than that, it needed the legitimization of jihad.186 But the unconditional 
continuation of its attacks against Israel could have led to a massive rejection of Hamas 
itself because the public would have seen Hamas as a saboteur of the popular peace 
process.187 However, the renunciation of violence would have deprived Hamas of its 
legitimacy incorporating jihad. More important, it would have carried the inherent risk of 
neutralizing Hamas’ identity, and complete containment by its opponent Fatah and the 
newly established PA.188 The path chosen by Fatah and the PLO, to actively join the 
peace process, was not an option for Hamas. The question was how to maintain support 
and legitimacy. In order to secure its very existence, Hamas was compelled to adapt to 
the situation. This meant that Hamas had to keep its identity, while at the same time 
maintaining public support and adapting its actions to the constraints of the new political 
conditions.  
Hamas had to cope with several problems. The intifada had been the most 
favorable condition for Hamas’ development and to become a popular alternative to the 
PLO.189 Oslo put the intifada to an end; therefore, Hamas needed to adapt to the situation 
in order to maintain its position. More severe was the problem of jihad. As the Hamas 
Charter shows, defensive jihad is at the very core of its identity. The Oslo Peace Accords 
made it difficult to legitimize jihad for the Palestinian cause if the Palestinians agreed to 
peace. Additionally, the rejection of the armed struggle and adherence to the peace 
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process implied the threat of being contained and controlled by the PLO and the PA.190 
Hamas decided to follow two lines of operations. To preserve its support, Hamas 
officially announced the Oslo Accords as illegitimate and tried to increase public 
opposition.191 Due to the broad support for the Accord, Hamas carefully avoided being 
blamed for sabotaging the process.192 To legitimize its twofold strategy, the movement 
declared that it was willing to follow any peaceful solution, but that the offers in the 
peace talks were invalid.193 Therefore, the agreement did not present peace but only a 
continuation of oppression. This put Hamas in a position as a defender of real peace for 
the Palestinians and legitimized continued violence against the oppression. 
The first part of the strategy was the continued use of violence. Hamas tried to 
present its violence as retaliation for Israeli attacks. Hamas responded to events and 
exploited opportunities, such as the 1994 massacre in Hebron. Thereby, Hamas’ actions 
were justified as defensive and not as directly against the popular peace process. This was 
hoped to preserve the source of Hamas’ legitimacy, jihad, while at the same time 
avoiding any damage to its popularity.194 As an example, Hamas suspended its attacks in 
1995 in order not to disrupt the Israeli withdrawal and harm its own population.195 
Hamas had to consider both sides of the situation. As a poll from 1995 showed, support 
for armed attacks against Israel was given, but at the same time, a peace agreement was 
also popular.196 By continuing the armed struggle, Hamas was able to preserve its 
identity and its legitimacy because its definition of the illegitimate peace further allowed 
defensive jihad.197 Furthermore, the use of violence was aimed at sabotaging the peace 
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process and changing the conditions in favor of Hamas.198 In the course of events, this 
part of the strategy was valuable to some extent. Hamas’ continued violence gained 
support because it was perceived as the only means to defend against the perceived 
disproportionate Israeli use of retaliation.199 
The second part of the strategy concerned political activities. Hamas was fully 
aware that success of its “sabotage” of the peace process was limited.200 Hamas was 
competing against the PLO, and Fatah, and had to cope with the growing popularity of 
Arafat and the PA. The circumstances favored Hamas’ competitors. International support, 
the popularity of the Peace Process, and Israel’s position toward the PA and against 
Hamas weakened Hamas’ position. Furthermore, Hamas’ “strategic depth” was limited 
by the declining number of supporters.201 Another circumstance was Hamas’ internal 
weakness. The Oslo period revealed the tension within the leadership. An example of this 
is the internal 1992 discussion about the participations in elections for the PA. An 
internal bulletin202 shows that Hamas thoroughly examined its possibilities in political 
participation. Nonetheless, the argument between the hardliner and the moderate 
leadership, ended with the decision not to participate.203 A reason for that was the 
intention of the external leadership not to strengthen the internal, moderate leadership too 
much. Furthermore, the assessment of the outcome of the 1995 elections was in favor of 
Arafat and the PA. As a conclusion, Hamas assessed that its likely defeat in elections 
would further weaken its position by revealing its weak stance to the public. In this view, 
the participation would have been suicidal.204 However, its weak position “made its 
policy of adjustment a preferable option to both Hamas’s ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
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leaders.”205 Thereby, Hamas maintained its cohesion, which could have been at risk if the 
decision had led to a militant escalation of violence.206 Hamas tried to maintain its 
position of opposition while at the same time trying to exploit the opportunities of 
gaining political influence by elections.207 It did not participate as an organization in the 
1995 elections, but encouraged its members to participate on an individual basis.208 As a 
result, Hamas was able to maintain its identity, cohesion, and its legitimacy. Hamas’ 
decisions about political participation were guided by three questions:209 First, does 
participation help to maintain the group’s own position? Second, how to exploit 
opportunities without neutralizing its own position as opposition by recognizing the PA? 
Third, what are the internal goals of the different leadership to keep their power? These 
questions show some patterns of behavior, which can be found in the leadership. The 
internal leadership, opposed to direct threat, was more willing to establish cooperation 
and legal political participation (as a statement of Sheik Yassin shows)210 and power 
sharing with the PA. The external leadership, which included the leaders of the militant 
wing, insisted on participation in armed struggle.211 The course of events clearly showed 
a dominance of the hardliner, external leadership, over the internal moderates. The 
internal political leadership had only limited influence over the military wing and was 
weakened by the arrest of its important leaders like Sheik Yasin.212 Furthermore, as 
shown, the external leadership controlled funding and had the loyalty of the military 
wing. Although, the dominating leadership was aware of the movement’s limitations 
compared to the PA, due to circumstances the militant and external leadership rejected 
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any participation with the PA. Their aim was to maintain Hamas as an armed resistance 
force. Therefore, Hamas carried on with violence.213 
While following this policy of adjustment, Hamas had to deal with its 
competitors. The increased international pressure to stop the terrorist attacks forced the 
PA to deal with Hamas. The PA’s position was twofold. On the one side, the PA tried to 
stop Hamas’ violence in order to cope with international demands. On the other side, the 
PA tolerated Hamas in order strengthen Arafat’s position in the negotiations with Israel 
as the trustworthy Palestinian representative.214 The Hamas tried to avoid a direct 
confrontation with the PA and at the same time secure its position. However, Hamas 
engaged in negotiations with the PA. Due to the fact that the position of Hamas, not to 
abandon armed combat, and the PA’s position were incompatible, there was no success in 
the negotiations. Nonetheless, Hamas had to back down because of the dominant position 
of the PA. Therefore, Hamas agreed not to conduct any attacks from PA territory; at the 
same time, it was able to act from Israeli controlled territory. This allowed the movement 
to continue attacks against Israel. In the end, this allowed Hamas to sustain the legitimacy 
for its actions and even more importantly to maintain its identity.215 Besides talks with 
the PA, Hamas continued to criticize the Accords as illegitimate and unjust. 
The Oslo Peace Accords and their aftermath show that “Hamas had calculated its 
strategy on a cost–benefit basis and so now was trying to avoid a slide into absurdity in 
its effort to realize its objectives. Hamas recognized the limits of its power… jihad turned 
out not to be an ultimate goal but a political instrument wielded by political 
considerations.”216 Five facts emerge from that recognition. First, prior to the Oslo Peace 
Accords, Hamas expanded and left the clandestine sphere. This implied that it depended 
even more on public support and legitimacy. Second, due to the vitality of the public 
support for the movement’s survival, maintenance of the organization was a main 
                                                 
213  Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, 72. 
214  Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 
2001), 445–448. 
215  Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, 74–75. 
216  Ibid., 64. 
 53
concern in the group’s decision making and a necessary contribution to the protection of 
the group’s center of gravity. The decision making revolved around the questions of how 
to maintain its position and how to contribute to further achievements. The answers to 
these questions depended on the respective leadership: hardliner or moderate. Third, 
Hamas adapted to the circumstances in order “to live with the post-Oslo reality without 
recognizing Israel…” and “to play the role of a ‘positive’ opposition to the ruling power, 
focusing on social, economic, and political grievance that would underscore—and 
legitimize—its separate existence.”217 Fourth, violence is a political means and its use 
depends on a cost–benefit analysis. Furthermore, the use of violence did not exclude 
political participation. Hroub showed that besides the adherence to violence, Hamas was 
aware of the political power and legitimacy that can be derived from elections and 
participation.218 As he further showed, Hamas regularly and successfully participated in 
student and professional association elections, as well as in municipal elections.219 Fifth, 
Hamas’ decision making was strongly influenced by its leadership. Two general positions 
are discernible. The internal leadership (leaders inside Palestine) are directly exposed to 
threats and challenges and more willing to moderate. The external leadership (like the 
members of the Political Bureau in Syria) is more willing to adhere to a strong opposing 
position. Thereby the militant leadership is more loyal to the external leadership and 
more willing to adhere to violence. Moreover, the tension between the two factions is a 
permanent threat to the movement’s cohesion.220 
The Hamas decision to take a counter-position to the peace process and oppose its 
competitors was based on necessities. However, the course of events, including the 
stalemate in the peace process and the obvious inability of the PA to govern Palestine 
contributed to Hamas’ stance. With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, the situation 
again changed, this time in favor of Hamas. 
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C.  THE AL-AQSA UPRISING 
With the violent riots following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, the 
killing of Muhammad al-Dhurra, and the lynching of two Israeli reservists in Ramallah, 
the al-Aqsa intifada started in 2000. It marked the end of the declining Oslo Peace 
process and the resurrection of Hamas’ momentum. 
As in the first two examples, the first intifada and the Oslo Peace Accord, Hamas 
responded to situational changes, opportunities and incentives, this time favored by the 
course of events and the stance it took in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. Hamas’ 
decisions and actions in the al-Aqsa intifada must be understood in the context of the 
organization’s development following 1995. 
Hamas positioned itself in opposition to the PLO and the PA. It sustained its 
armed resistance, using suicide attacks and addressing these attacks as a response to 
Israeli violence. Additionally, Hamas tried to extend its influence in an indirect approach. 
As explained, Hamas officially refused to participate in the 1996 PA elections because it 
described them as not in favor of the Palestinian cause.221 On the other hand, Hamas 
supported individual participation, thereby trying to exploit success in elections and to 
increase its influence in the administration without officially abandoning its position.222  
This stance paid off for Hamas due to the failure of the Oslo process and the 
inability of the PA to govern. The Oslo peace process failed, creating a situation that led 
to the second intifada and provided a couple of incentives and opportunities for Hamas. 
At the end of the 1990s, public opinion swung against the PA and the peace process.223 
The “PA had lost much of the popular goodwill it had received upon its arrival.”224 Far 
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away from proceeding with the peace process, the PA and Fatah proved to be inept, 
corrupt and autocratic rather than pursuing politics in favor of the Palestinian people.225 
Israeli settlements increased, further proving to the Palestinians that the PA was unable to 
keep its promises.226 Additionally, Fatah’s internal rivalry bolstered an increasing 
support for Hamas.227 In general, the situation for all Palestinians changed from the 
prospect of prosperity by a peace process to the real threat of poverty under an inept 
government.228 In summary, all the internal Palestinian developments seemed to prove 
Hamas’ opposition stance correct. Hamas had opposed the Oslo Accord from the 
beginning, which made its position at the end of the 1990s even more popular. The 
outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada finally enabled Hamas to address the majority of 
Palestinians.229 Not only did the Palestinians feel a common deprivation from the failure 
of the peace process, after the escalation of the violence, they felt a common threat from 
and grievances against the excessive force used by the Israelis.230 In return, this allowed 
Hamas to legitimize its excessive suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. 
The situation in the dawn of the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada offered Hamas a 
number of opportunities and incentives. First of all, the outbreak of the second intifada 
allowed Hamas to directly respond in accordance with public opinion. As polls and 
Jeroen Gunning have shown, the support for suicide attacks increased after the second 
intifada started.231 This was the incentive for Hamas to increase the use of violence by 
accelerating its suicide attacks. This incentive was strengthened by another fact. The 
actions and counteractions of Israelis and Palestinians created a spiral of violence that 
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had a deep impact on public opinion and favored Hamas. It led to a polarization of the 
Palestinian society towards violence.232 The Israeli counteractions radicalized the 
Palestinian population.233 Analysis shows that the increasing number of fatalities shifted 
public support away from more moderate positions towards violence. This helped Hamas 
and was a disadvantage for moderate factions like Fatah.234 This did not mean that 
Hamas became the dominant faction in Palestine, but the growing support for its radical 
stance clearly helped Hamas because it did not have to make major changes to its course 
of action and could reach back to a ready militia force.235 The local experience of 
fatalities created public opinion in favor of violence in the major part of the society.236 
Additionally, the commonly felt grievances and escalation of violence provided a frame 
in which Hamas successfully addressed the masses.237 This also helped Hamas to 
legitimize the increased use of suicide attacks.238 The coercive effect of the suicide 
attacks provoked retaliation and further contributed to the escalation spiral, which in turn 
paid off for Hamas.239 Furthermore, Hamas’ assessment was that suicide attacks were a 
successful means to coerce Israeli decisions. Although they provoked Israeli counter 
actions, suicide attacks were approved by public support and contributed to public 
support.240 
A second fact is that Hamas exploited the opportunity to improve its position 
against the Fatah. The circumstances presented Hamas as a viable option for the 
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Palestinian cause while the Fatah struggled with internal discord. Furthermore, Hamas’ 
organization allowed an immediate response, including suicide attacks, while Fatah 
lacked the capabilities to use violence in the same way, which finally led to the formation 
of Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade in 2000.241 Hamas was able to gain and maintain 
the momentum in the al-Aqsa intifada. 
Concerning the leadership, the failure of the Oslo Peace Process and the al-Aqsa 
intifada clearly strengthened the militant leadership and the external leadership that 
opposed political participation and tended to follow a violent hard-line.242 
As shown, Hamas was “embedded” in the whole situation prior to and after the 
beginning of the second intifada. This allowed Hamas to promote its ideology without 
any logical breaks between ideology and practice. More than that, the al-Aqsa intifada 
was in accordance with Hamas’ concept of defensive jihad. Even more important, the 
public support for violence against Israel supported Hamas’ ideology. This led to the 
Hamas decision to participate in the al-Aqsa intifada with full force in order to exploit as 
many opportunities as possible and to improve its stance in Palestine. What can be 
learned from this example is again Hamas’ situational awareness and its decision making 
based on a cost-benefit analysis. Even though Hamas used violence to its full extent, it 
was because of an analysis that included “Israeli policies, intra Palestine rivalries, 
consideration of popular support and internal tensions.”243 Thereby Hamas applied the 
lessons it had learned during the first intifada and the Oslo period. Hamas was able to 
initiate violence quickly and to exploit the opportunity to gain public support because the 
spiral of events between attacks and Israeli counter-measures put hardships on the 
Palestinian people, which legitimized violence and increased their support for suicide 
attacks.244 Due to its use of suicide attacks before the al-Aqsa intifada and its capability 
of promoting martyrdom as an appropriate measure to defend against Israel, Hamas was 
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able to use these circumstances to gain the public’s support. The decision, in light of the 
al-Aqsa intifada, proved the findings from the 1990s examples that Hamas used its 
charter for framing but based its decisions on political necessities.245 
By the time the al-Aqsa intifada came to an end, it had created fertile ground for 
Hamas. Security and civil services in Palestine were weakened or had broken down, and 
the civil situation had further deteriorated.246 Fatah’s position was weakened also due to 
its close ties to the failing Palestinian government. In contrast, Hamas still maintained its 
charity organizations and provided public support.247 Additionally, it had gained support 
during the second intifada as a viable option to the PA, which was perceived as inept and 
corrupt. When it came to the elections in 2006, the situation started to change. Fatah’s 
popularity increased and the majority of the Palestinians were again in favor of peace and 
security.248 This time, the incentives and opportunities led Hamas to participate with a 
political party in the 2006 elections. The results are known. Nonetheless, Hamas had not 
gained major support but campaigned as a united and legitimate and viable opposition.249 
Together with the elections’ system, this resulted in Hamas’ success. In contrast to its 
decision for violence in the wake of the al-Aqsa intifada, this time Hamas saw the 
opportunity to gain more influence through the political system.250  
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The post-9/11 security environment caused Hamas to respond to the threat of a 
war against terrorism against all such assessed groups. Furthermore, Israel used this 
opportunity for a crackdown on all Palestinian radical movements. Hamas’ reaction again 
proved its character as a rational actor with an Islamic nationalist agenda rather than just 
another participant in the global jihad. 
D. HAMAS IN THE POST-9/11 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The terror attacks of 9/11 not only changed the U.S. course of action but also 
changed the rules of the game for Hamas. The 9/11 attacks brought all radical Islamic 
movements into the focus of anti-terror countermeasures, whether they were Al-Qaeda 
partners or not.  
Looking at Hamas’ roots, its charter, and its center of gravity, shows that Hamas 
is not an organization with interests or objectives in global jihad, as is Al-Qaeda. Hamas 
developed within domestic circumstances, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and derived its 
momentum from the course of events. Therefore, Hamas as an organization defines its 
objectives in reference to the Palestinian conflict. Due to this domestic focus, Hamas has 
no intentions or objectives in participating in global jihad. As explained, Hamas’ charter 
expresses its ideology. This charter is a combination of the idea of an Islamized society 
with a cause for its own land. This combination of goals has no connection to a global 
fight against infidels because it is strictly concerned with Palestine. Although Hamas’ 
decisions and actions do not always follow its charter, there is no reason for Hamas to 
join global jihad. This is also shown by Hamas’ center of gravity. Hamas, as a powerful 
organization, derives its strength out of its capability to influence the course of events in 
Palestine. Besides funding,251 the capabilities and requirements Hamas needs are 
domestically based. Therefore, global jihad has no implications for Hamas. Moreover, to 
be associated with global jihad and Al-Qaeda poses a threat to Hamas.252 As Gunning 
explained, and as can be seen from Hamas’ Charter and center of gravity, participation in 
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the global jihad would have sidelined “the Palestinian question”253 thereby weakening 
Hamas’ position in Palestine and its cause for a Palestinian state. Additionally, such an 
association would have increased the efforts to crackdown on Hamas beyond what Israel 
was already doing. As a matter of fact, Hamas’ leadership tried to avoid any connection 
with Al-Qaeda.254 Interviews of Hamas leaders from 2002 support this assessment. The 
interviewed leaders put their emphasis on the national cause, and tried to stress the fact 
that Hamas was not engaged in the global jihad.255 Furthermore, they emphasized that the 
U.S., in general, was not thought of as an enemy.256 Moreover, the association with Al-
Qaeda could have been an advantage for Hamas’ domestic competitors, Fatah and PA. 
The PA and Arafat tried to improve their position by searching further cooperation with 
Israel and the U.S.257 Together with an increased risk of Israeli crackdowns, this 
threatened Hamas position.258 Hamas attempted to keep a “low profile” after the attacks 
of 9/11 and the declaration of the war on terror. It did not respond to Osama bin Laden’s 
comments and condemned violence against innocents.259 Furthermore, it refrained from 
violence in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.260 
What can be taken away from this example again are Hamas’ situational 
awareness and its rationality concerning opportunities for and threats against the 
organization. A pragmatic strategy would have to suspend all attacks so as to deprive 
Israel from the opportunity to paint Hamas with the same brush as Al-Qaeda. But, this 
would have compelled Hamas to give up its identity, to re-define resistance and to 
transform the movement in such a rapid and radical way that Hamas would have lost its 
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cohesion and its sustainability. If Hamas had adhered to a violent course of action only, it 
would have used the opportunity of 9/11 to promote violence. Palestinian public support 
for violence was still strong, and moreover, the majority did not assess Palestinian armed 
action against Israel as terror.261 But, in contrast, Hamas seemed to be sensitive about 
public opinion, which was at that time, swaying between support of violence and de-
escalation.262  As far as Hamas’ objectives and its center of gravity are concerned, any 
support of global jihad would have been counterproductive. Rather than joining the 
terrorist cause of global jihad, Hamas tried to avoid becoming a major target and to 
maintain its position. Moreover, the focus on the Palestinian domestic struggle gave 
Hamas’ position continuity in further developments. As Gunning and polls showed, the 
public opinion turned away from the support of violence towards a ceasefire and 
negotiations.263 Thereby, the growing number of supporters for a ceasefire and 
negotiations also included a growing number of Hamas members.264 Had Hamas joined 
the course of global jihad, it would have been difficult to maintain the movement’s 
cohesion and to respond to the changes in the Palestinian domestic circumstances. 
Hamas’ response after the attacks of 9/11 was the attempt to keep it out of the 
“main target area” of the global war against terrorism and sustaining its position in 
Palestine. Although Hamas suffered losses due to Israeli operations after 9/11, it 
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sustained its position. In the further course of events, this position was the starting point 
to cope with circumstances that again turned away from armed resistance towards 
progress in the peace process and political participation. This set the stage for Hamas’ 
participation in the 2006 elections. 
E. HAMAS, THE 2006 ELECTIONS AND THE COALITION 
GOVERNMENT 
Hamas carefully assessed its opportunities, not only for armed combat, but also 
for political participation. In the post-9/11 environment, this led to Hamas’ participation 
in the 2006 elections.  
As early as 2002, the leadership had not excluded participation in elections.265 
Still, then, Hamas accused the PLO and the PA of ruling against the Palestinians by 
following the “Oslo regime” and said their elections were not just.266 This stance was in 
accordance with Hamas’ position during Oslo and the second intifada. Due to the fact 
that this position did not reject political reconciliation in general, it was easy for Hamas 
to again adapt to the changing circumstances. Three developments were of importance. 
First, while the support for the PA had been steadily declining since 2002 and the 
majority assessed the government as inept and corrupt, public support also shifted 
towards a new peace process and the end of violence.267 Second, after Arafat’s death in 
2004, the political system and the 2006 elections presented new opportunities to Hamas 
for political participation, while the adherence to violence became more difficult. Third, 
the overall political solution favored the more moderate leaders. The moderate leaders 
were able to gain support within Hamas for political participation because the situation 
offered the chance to improve Hamas’ position in Palestine. Based on these 
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developments, Hamas decided to participate in the elections. With its participation 
Hamas maintained its cohesion and successfully addressed concerns about public 
opinion. This was one reason for its success. 
Public support shifted from support of violence towards support of the peace 
process and a cease fire.268 This was not an immediate shift in public opinion, but a 
process. Three things are of importance when looking at public opinion.269 While the 
public support for violence steadily declined and the support for a ceasefire and 
negotiations increased, armed combat was assessed as a contributor to the Palestinian 
cause. This gave Hamas, in general, a good reputation. However, this was not enough to 
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bolster support for Hamas, as the declining support in polls from 2004 and 2005 
indicated.270 Second, the growing support for a ceasefire and revived negotiations, as 
well as the Israeli decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, made it difficult for Hamas 
to legitimize its violence as defensive jihad. As the polls indicated, support for Hamas’ 
attacks steadily declined. Hamas’ decisions to accept ceasefires in 2003 and 2005 showed 
that Hamas tried to cope with this change. As during the Oslo Peace Accords, Hamas 
tried not to be blamed as a saboteur of any agreements.271 Moreover, Hamas also 
benefited from the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip by better inner Palestinian 
freedom of action. Due to this, Hamas had a particular interest in complying with the 
agreements.272 Finally, while public opinion shifted toward peace, the support for the PA 
steadily declined as the civil situation in Palestine further deteriorated.273 This paid off 
for Hamas in the later course of events since it had refused to join the PA because of its 
connection to the Oslo Accords, which had been rejected by Hamas. When the 
Palestinian political system opened, after Arafat’s death, this stance allowed Hamas to 
participate politically as an opposition without diverging from its former position.  
The second development, already mentioned, was the change in the Palestinian 
political environment. Since 1996, the Palestinian governmental administration had been 
dominated by Hamas’ prime rival, the Fatah. Political positions had been filled by 
                                                 
270  Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll no. 14: First Serious 
Signs of Optimism since the Start of Intifada; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public 
Opinion Poll no. 18: With Optimism Fading, and Three Months After the Completion of the Israeli 
Unilateral Disengagement from the Gaza Strip Support for a Permanent Settlement Along the Clinton 
Parameters and the Geneva Initiative Drops but a Large Majority Continues to Support the Hudna and 
Fateh's Popularity Increases. 
271  Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, 231–235. 
272  Ibid., 233. 
273  Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Public Opinion Poll no. 13: After Four Years 
of Intifada, an Overwhelming Sense of Insecurity Prevails among Palestinians Leading to High Level of 
Support for Bombing and Rockets Attacks at the One Hand and to High Levels of Demand for Mutual 
Cessation of Violence and Questioning of the Effectiveness of Armed Attacks on the Other," Palestinian 
Center for Policy and Survey Research, http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2004/p13a.html (accessed 
January 20, 2009); Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll no. 18: With 
Optimism Fading, and Three Months After the Completion of the Israeli Unilateral Disengagement from 
the Gaza Strip Support for a Permanent Settlement Along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative 
Drops but a Large Majority Continues to Support the Hudna and Fateh's Popularity Increases. 
 65
appointment. Elections, neither on the municipality level nor above, took place.274 
Together with Hamas’ rejection of joining an Oslo affiliated government, these “frozen” 
conditions presented no opportunity for Hamas to gain an advantage. Nonetheless, 
Hamas was fully aware of the power of political legitimacy and had successfully 
participated in elections below the municipality level.275 However, this participation did 
not provide Hamas with overall political power, but did show that Hamas was aware of 
possible opportunities. In 1996, when Hamas last refused participation in elections, this 
fact of political participation and the opportunities coming from it were internally 
discussed.276 While at that time participation would have been an identity dilemma for 
Hamas,277 the 2004–2006 reintroductions of elections presented a different situation. 
Still, in 2004, Hamas rejected participation in the elections because it saw no chance to 
compete against the Fatah.278 Shortly after, with Arafat’s death and the following 
leadership vacuum and the growing support for Hamas, the situation changed. Now, the 
political system opened for participation with a prospect of success.  Additionally, Fatah 
and Abbas were unable to initiate successful reforms of the political system or to improve 
law and order or the economic situation.279 This gave Hamas the opportunity to 
participate as an opposition.280 Additionally, gaining political power against Fatah was a 
common interest, as well, of both the hardliner and the moderate leaders. To participate 
in elections presented an opportunity to maintain the position Hamas had gained in the al-
Aqsa intifada and to cope with the decreasing public support for violence.281 
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The third development in Hamas move towards political integration was the shift 
of the momentum from the hard-line to the moderate approach. In the course of events in 
the intifada, the military wing had been weakened by Israeli countermeasures and 
improved intelligence.282 Furthermore, Hamas had to compensate for the loss of senior 
leadership members due to their arrests by Israel.283 While the containment of its militant 
activities and the arrests did not neutralize the organization as a whole, they decreased the 
capabilities for armed operations and options for the hardliners. Furthermore, Iran did not 
provide backup for the maintenance of full scale militant activities because the reformist 
Khatami government tried to avoid any provocation of the U.S.284 Syria, also, did not 
want to give strong support to Hamas because it was concerned about possible U.S. 
actions against it. In contrast, Syria tried to exert pressure on Hamas to participate in a 
ceasefire.285 These facts further minimized the freedom of action for the hardliner 
leadership towards more radical options.286 It is important to note that the decline of the 
support for violence could also be found within Hamas, which made it necessary for the 
leadership to cope with this new situation.287 This decline in the options for armed 
resistance came along with another fact. The political legitimacy Hamas could gain from 
elections presented an “insurance policy” against possible repressive actions by the 
PA.288 Additionally, the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip allowed a suitable 
starting point for political participation because Hamas could claim “credit for having 
made continued occupation too costly.”289 This contributed to Hamas’ claim to 
contribute to the Palestinian cause. Together with the developments described and 
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Hamas’ later actions, there is an indication of a shift of the internal momentum towards 
political activities away from the adherence solely to armed resistance. 
In order to enter into political participation, Hamas needed to develop an 
instrument to do so, while at the same time preserving its identity as a resistance 
movement. Hamas’ charter defines the movement’s identity as a resistance movement 
and is very idealistic. In contrast to that, participation in elections required Hamas to 
address the needs and daily life concerns of the Palestinians. To deviate from its Charter 
by its actions was nothing new for the Hamas, as can be seen from the Oslo period. But, 
to participate in parliamentary elections required a complete political agenda. While 
Hamas had already participated in municipal and association elections with individuals or 
groups, Hamas this time needed a tool for participation that would allow presenting a 
political agenda. Hamas, as a whole, founded the Change and Reform Party. Thereby, 
Hamas’ political agenda deviates from the original Charter.290 It is concerned with issues 
of daily life and governance under current conditions rather than with the ideology of the 
Charter. The Hamas leadership accepted a dichotomy between its Charter and the 
opportunities of the situation. Thereby, the decision to participate in politics did not lead 
to a split in the movement.291 
Hamas’ internal assessment did not foresee the success in the 2006 elections that 
the movement had. The assessment was that Fatah would win and the new Parliament 
would continue talks with Israel.292 However, the political participation was still 
valuable. Beside the fact of legitimacy, participation provided the movement with the 
official position of a strong opposition.293 This was favored by the movement’s 
hardliners.294 The moderates saw the opportunity of active political participation in the 
government as the chance to influence politics in accordance with Hamas’ political 
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program.295 What is important about this program is that it was developed shortly after 
the decision to form the “Hamas party.” Although the program does not go into much 
detail about how to solve the Palestinian issues, it addresses the fields of governance in 
which Hamas wanted to participate. The topics range from “administrative reform and 
fighting corruption,” to “social policy” and “youth issues” up to “transport and border 
crossings.”296 The lack of depth might result from the fact that Hamas did not expect to 
win. Nonetheless, this electoral platform for the Change and Reform Party indicated 
Hamas’ pragmatism and its willingness to participate in politics apart from solely 
adhering to violence. Another indicator for this was the fact that Hamas referred to 
political issues rather than religion as the Hamas Charter does.297 Furthermore, the 
selection of the personnel to participate in the elections indicated a willingness for 
participation. Rather than selecting clericals who would stick to the Islamist Charter, 
Hamas chose secular professionals.298 Even as opposition, Hamas’ leadership clearly 
showed the pragmatism of political participation. Another fact that helped Hamas as a 
whole was its improved position against Fatah. As in Hamas, there were different 
positions in the Fatah leadership, “the old guard” and the “young guard.”299 While the 
old guard refused to cooperate with Hamas, the young guard was more willing to 
cooperate.300 This shows that Fatah was divided while Hamas managed to maintain the 
movement’s cohesion. Hamas’ success in the elections contributed to its position versus 
Fatah because it deepened the rift between Fatah’s old and young guard.301 
Hamas succeeded in the elections for several reasons. First of all, it maintained its 
cohesion. Party and movement acted as a unit. The party started as an opposition party 
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and could refer back to Hamas’ record as a resistance movement, which contributed to its 
popularity.302 At the same time, Hamas minimized or halted its armed operation, thereby 
acting in accordance with the program of the political party.303 Additionally, the political 
wing of Hamas could prove that it represented a suitable alternative to the inept PA. As 
examples from municipal elections, which preceded parliament elections show, the 
elected Hamas councils were able to improve living conditions and security, two factors 
in accordance with its program.304  
Hamas’ political program also successfully addressed the concerns of society. The 
main concerns of the public were security, corruption, the deteriorating economic 
situation, and increasing anarchy.305 Hamas’ political program clearly addressed these 
issues.306 Furthermore, the program added to the perception of Hamas as honest and 
acting in favor of the Palestinians. This perception came from Hamas’ resistance 
reputation,307 its opposition stance against the PA and its ongoing charity actions that 
were maintained after the elections.308 Another fact contributed to that. Hamas had a 
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greater “institutional presence” in urban areas.309 Together with its coordinated, cohesive, 
and guided campaign, it was therefore able to appeal to a greater number of voters. In 
contrast to that, Fatah had stronger support in the rural areas.310 
The third reason for political success was that Hamas acted cohesively, but also 
presented its candidates this way. Whereas Fatah participated in the elections with many 
candidates, Hamas limited its number of candidates. The fewer candidates were assessed 
as having a better chance to win. Total votes for Fatah were divided between a large 
number of candidates because of its own internal divisions. Hamas was able to 
consolidate the received votes for its candidates.311 Together with its campaign, this 
contributed to Hamas’ victory.312 
In its own assessment, the victory caught the Hamas leadership by surprise.313 
Rather than acting out of the safe position of a legitimized opposition, it now had to 
participate in the government and had to keep its promises. 
The momentum was with the moderates within Hamas. Concerning its rival 
Fatah, the defeat in the elections shifted the internal moment towards the “young guards” 
or “inclusionists” who were willing to cooperate with Hamas.314 That this mutual 
cooperation was a viable alternative is shown by two documents: The Prisoners 
Documents, which later became the National Reconciliation Document and the Mecca 
Agreement. 
In the Prisoners Document, both sides agreed on cooperation. Although this 
document was rejected by the hardliners, they were compelled to accept this cooperation 
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due to the circumstances. This is shown in an interview with Khalid Mishal who 
presented the document as a cohesive document315 and the fact that Hamas showed its 
willingness to cooperate with a proposed National Unity Government Program.316 The 
Prisoners Document, in particular, showed that cooperation was assessed as the best way 
for317 Hamas to cope with its own unpreparedness to govern and with the strong public 
support for a unity government.318 Another important fact is that these documents 
showed that Hamas was able to moderate towards a two-state solution.319 Hamas, of 
course, did not officially accept the two-state solution in order to preserve its identity.320 
Again, this shows Hamas’ ability to temper its identity with practical necessities. 
Furthermore, it shows the influence of the leadership. While the hardliners assessed the 
political victory as an opportunity to consolidate the movement’s position, which still did 
not exclude violence, the moderates saw the opportunity of state-building with a Hamas 
influence.321  Nonetheless, the two documents and the Mecca Agreement indicate that the 
moderates had the momentum and the chance for political inclusion in a Palestinian 
government was at hand. Furthermore, public support for reconciliation and a unity 
government gave further enhancement to political participation.322 In the Mecca 
Agreement, both sides compromised on a combined government. However, after the 
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formation, each side might have tried to dominate the other, but the fact that a hardliner 
like Mishal depicted the Mecca Agreement as a viable solution further indicated that a 
political process with a unity government could be possible.323 Even after the unity 
government failed, Hamas’ cabinet platform shows that political participation and 
cooperation was still possible.324  This further indicated that the moderate leaders still 
had opportunities to act without putting the movement’s identity at risk by moderating 
between the necessity of international acceptance and Hamas’ basic tenets.325 
The unity government failed because of the missing international acceptance. The 
Quartet’s rejection of Hamas’ moderates and its imposed isolation shifted the momentum 
back to the hardliners. Concerning Fatah, it allowed Abbas to act unilaterally and exploit 
the situation to improve Fatah’s position, which in turn triggered Hamas’ response with 
violence to secure its own position.326 This ended the short cooperation between the 
moderates.327 Furthermore, it diminished the freedom of action for Hamas’ moderates. 
Hamas could not make the strategic shift demanded by the international community 
because this would have inevitably led to a split away from the movement’s identity.328 
The isolation approach failed to identify Hamas’ center of gravity. The moderation 
Hamas showed after the elections was the compromise between preserving the 
movement’s identity while at the same time maintaining its center of gravity. Instead of 
fostering moderate tendencies, the isolation approach forced even the moderate leaders to 
reject further political participation.329 The isolation completely failed. Public opinion 
                                                 
323  Rabbani, A Hamas Perspective on the Movement's Evolving Role: An Interview with Khalid 
Mishal: Part II, 73. 
324  Hroub, A New Hamas through its New Documents, 6, 19–22. 
325  Ibid., 20, 22. 
326  Shikaki, With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the 
Peace Process, 9. 
327  Ibid., 16. 
328  International Crisis Group, Middle East Report no. 62: After Mecca: Engaging Hamas, 30; 
Shikaki, With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the Peace 
Process, 12. 
329  Shikaki, With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the 
Peace Process, 12. 
 73
did not turn against Hamas.330 On the contrary, it bolstered the hardliners in Hamas who 
could now argue that Hamas was acting from a legitimized position.331  In turn, this again 
opened up the options for violence. The hardliners regained momentum and manifested 
their position in the violent clashes between Hamas and Fatah throughout 2007. The next 
chapter shows that this situation diminished further possibilities of moderation and led to 
the latest escalation of the conflict. 
The 2006 elections and the short period of Hamas-Fatah cooperation demonstrate 
two important facts. 
First, this period is the demonstration of Hamas’ rational decision making. It is 
important to see the impact of the situational circumstances. Before and after the 
elections, the circumstances provided incentives for moderate behavior, which was 
accepted even by the hardliners. The response to situational incentives makes Hamas’ 
behavior, to some extent, predictable. 
Second, while Hamas was responding to incentives, it was nonetheless a cohesive 
movement with a common identity. Its stance against the Oslo Accords and the PA 
combined its resistant character, as defined in its Charter, with the role of political 
opposition. Therefore, Hamas was able to use the opportunities for political participation 
without giving up its character, as an opposition factor, which helped maintain the 
movement’s cohesion. The opposition stance made it easier to moderate between its 
Charter and real activities because as an opposition Hamas still rejected preceding 
political agreements (like the Oslo Accords), which coped with Hamas’ resistance 
identity. In the elections, Hamas’ aim was to secure its gained position. Therefore, it had 
to maintain its center of gravity, which required cohesion and adherence to its identity, 
laid down in its charter. This prevented Hamas from a full transformation. Nonetheless, it 
shows that Hamas was able to temper its identity with practical necessities. Furthermore, 
it opened the possibility for moderation and inclusion in a true political process. 
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F. THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER AND THE ROAD TO THE 
DECEMBER 2008–JANUARY 2009 ESCALATION 
1. The Takeover 
The failure of the unity government shifted the momentum in Hamas back to the 
hardliners. In this new situation, Hamas had to cope with different challenges. First, 
Hamas had to compete against its competitors, foremost the PA and Fatah. Second, 
Hamas had to continue to govern and to prove its viability in order to maintain public 
support. Third, it had to cope with complete isolation of the Gaza Strip. The hardliners, 
who already had assessed the 2006 election victory as an opportunity to consolidate 
Hamas powers,332 dominated Hamas’ decisions and actions after the failure of the unity 
government.  
The new situation after the unity government’s failure and the imposed isolation 
left Hamas with the risk of being contained by the Fatah, which was supported by the 
Middle East Quartet and to some extent by Israel.333 Even if Hamas’ leaders declared 
their willingness to restart negotiations with the Fatah,334 the rejection of this by Fatah 
allowed freedom of action by the Hamas hardliners.335 Public opinion at that time was 
caught between these two positions.336 In order to compete against Fatah, it was 
necessary for Hamas to secure its own area of influence. As the polls from 2007 show, 
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Hamas’ stronghold was the Gaza Strip.337 The hardliners already had assessed the 
election victory as an opportunity to consolidate power, but did not exclude inner 
Palestinian violence.338 As a logical consequence, Hamas decided to consolidate its 
power in its stronghold, the Gaza Strip. With the hardliners in the lead, this meant a 
crackdown of its opponents. The hardliner leadership explained this decision as an act of 
self defense.339 But, instead of being an act of self defense, the takeover was a logical 
combination of having missed incentives for political participation, hardliner dominance 
inside Hamas, and the intensifying intra-Palestinian power struggle. The takeover of the 
Gaza Strip was a concerted and well organized action.340 Far away from pure self-
defense, Hamas’ actions included not only a crackdown on its opponents but also the 
installation of Hamas’ power in government administration and public service.341  
Regarding the crackdown on opponents, Hamas’ first strike was against its main 
opponent, Fatah. When Hamas assumed control over the Gaza Strip in 2007, it did not 
terminate all of Fatah’s resistance. While Hamas, in 2007, focused its first strikes to take 
over the PA installations, in 2008 it focused on the neutralization of all Fatah 
capabilities.342 Thereby, Hamas directly targeted the clans that were related to Fatah. 
This fact deserves more attention. Palestinian politics is connected with family 
politics.343 Hamas, as well as the Fatah, used to recruit from clans.344 With this, the clans 
gained more and more power during the al-Aqsa intifada and were able to fill the power 
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gap, which the PA left when it failed to govern.345 Thereby, the clans established zones 
of autonomy with their own informal justice.346 Furthermore, clans are involved in 
businesses like smuggling, and illegal checkpoints, thereby further degrading public 
security and the ability to govern.347 Due to these facts, Hamas attacked the most 
influential clans in 2008. While targeting the clans associated with Fatah, Hamas was 
able to neutralize the Fatah’s capabilities in the Gaza Strip.348 Second, in the face of the 
isolation, the clan militias themselves imposed a threat to Hamas because they were able 
to counter Hamas in its attempt to present itself as the legitimized government and “to 
implement its policies.”349 A third reason was the effect that the neutralization of clan 
rules and the establishment of some kind of law and order contributed to Hamas.350 This, 
in turn, contributed to Hamas’ attempt to govern. After Hamas cracked down on Fatah in 
2008, it also turned against other opponents such as the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) or Islamic Jihad.351 Still Hamas’ leadership was able to combine this 
inner Palestinian violence with its identity. By declaring its aggression as an act of self 
defense and the fight for a unified political system, Hamas was able to combine its 
actions with the Palestinian cause of its charter.352 This violent neutralization of its 
opponents shows that Hamas hardliners were leading and dedicated to consolidating 
Hamas as the sole power in the Gaza Strip. Again, this shows that Hamas as an 
organization assesses its opportunities and possibilities under given circumstances. Due 
to the fact that isolation and the failure of the unity government more or less favored 
resistance only, Hamas decided to secure its position by using violence.  
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Two more facts are of importance in this concern: the ceasefire Hamas agreed on 
with Israel in July 2008 and public support. The ceasefire worked in three directions. 
First of all, Hamas needed to improve the economic situation in Gaza in order to govern. 
Therefore, it needed the truce to let Israel open the borders.353 In the long run, this 
attempt failed. Second, the truce enabled Hamas to concentrate its forces on the inside 
and to conduct a takeover. Furthermore, the maintenance of the truce, although it was 
fragile, was necessary for Hamas to maintain law and order in the Gaza Strip and to 
contain fighting its opponents.354 Third, as the government needed to prove its ability to 
govern it needed to establish connections to the international community.355 Although 
this attempt failed due to the maintained isolation, the truce showed Hamas’ willingness 
to negotiate on the international level. Additionally, the truce was supported by public 
opinion.356  
The second fact regarding Hamas and political control concerned public support. 
With its use of decisive force and violence in the Gaza Strip to consolidate its position, 
Hamas turned against its vital public support. Seemingly irrational, these actions 
nonetheless followed a rational assessment of the opportunities. In control of territory, 
Hamas leaders saw the opportunity to manifest Hamas’ rule as a fact and accelerate 
events. Thereby, in face of the isolation, self protection was the point of main effort.357 
The assessment by the leadership was a “first the sword, then the pen” assessment.358 
Public support would be damaged but could be regained when the people started to 
support the new government.359 This assessment did not work. Public opinion polls from 
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2007 show that the majority of the population rejected Hamas’ use of violence.360 
Nonetheless, Hamas did not lose all of its support. Its governance, foremost the 
establishment of some kind of law and order, the inability of the Abbas administration, 
and the stalemate of the peace process contributed to Hamas’ stance.361 The decline of 
public support until the end of 2008 was not a result of Hamas’ takeover of governance, 
but a fact of the continuing deteriorating situation, with no chance for Hamas to change 
the status quo, and no prospect of a solution.362 Later, this was one fact that led to the end 
of the ceasefire and the renewed rocket attacks. 
The second challenge facing Hamas was governance itself. As shown by its 
decision to accept cooperation in a unity government, Hamas was not prepared to take 
over the full responsibility of a government. Nonetheless, its success in the elections left 
it with no other choice. Hamas was not able to ignore this fact because the vital support 
of the public depended on Hamas’ success as an administration. Fortunately for Hamas, 
its limitations in performance were not blamed on Hamas, but on the circumstances.363 
Hamas approached its responsibilities as a government in two directions. First, it took 
over the administration. Second, it tried to run the economy in spite of the isolation. 
Simultaneously, with the crackdown on its opponents, Hamas established some 
kind of law and order, which worked as the polls indicated.364 This was not the end of the 
Hamas takeover. Hamas did not abandon the PA administrative apparatus but assimilated 
it. It replaced key personnel in all ministries and transformed the administrative 
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organizations so it was able to implement its policies through the official apparatus.365 As 
a result, Hamas manifested itself as the political power in the Gaza Strip. Two effects 
derive from this fact. First, the implementation of Hamas’ control in the administration 
contributed to the legitimacy it had gained after the elections and the attempt at the unity 
government.366 Second, with its takeover of the administration, Hamas deepened the 
inner Palestinian division. Hamas’ consolidation of power and territory in the Gaza Strip 
on the one side and the PA control of the West Bank and continued crackdown on Hamas 
on the other side, established two independent Palestinian governments.367 Furthermore, 
while both sides continued to consolidate their power, they used their new positions to 
compete with each other in their old rivalry. Both sides attained a position that allowed 
them to use the reconciliation process as a means to continue their struggle.”368 Abbas 
tried to contain the Hamas’ chapters at the West Bank while simultaneously improving 
the conditions in the West Bank. Hamas manifested its position in the Gaza Strip as a 
bargaining tool and was playing for time, exploiting the fact that reconciliation had to 
include Hamas and was pivotal for any progress in the peace process.369 
Concerning the economy, Hamas’ attempt to gain improvements from the truce 
failed.370 Throughout 2008, Hamas was still able to provide supplies and basic needs 
goods by “administering the smuggling.” A 2008 report assessed Hamas to be in control 
of about 90 percent of the tunnels thereby circumventing the isolation.371 Normal 
business relations collapsed and Hamas joined new business elites, built up new 
connections, and gained more influence.372 In the long run, however, Hamas was not able 
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to provide supplies to the Gaza Strip.373 This situation was not bearable for Hamas 
because it would have proven their inability as a government to cope with the isolation, 
and the deprived population would have rejected giving further support that would have 
weakened Hamas’ new consolidated power position. These are other factors that led to 
the 2009 escalations. 
The takeover left Hamas in a new situation. For the first time it controlled 
territory, which left it with a powerful position in Palestine to compete against its rival, 
Fatah and to contain its inner Palestinian opponents. Nonetheless, the new situation also 
left Hamas with some challenges. It had to govern while the isolation and struggle with 
the PA left it with few options besides resistance to do so. Additionally, the takeover 
ultimately strengthened its position in the Gaza Strip but left the Hamas chapters on the 
West Bank and leaders in the reach of the PA and Fatah. Concerning the leadership, the 
takeover turned the momentum to the political and militant leaders inside the Gaza 
Strip.374 This shows, again, that hardliners and moderates are not divided geographically 
only but can be found throughout the movement. Nonetheless, the new power 
constellation inside Hamas caused another division in the leadership. While the 
leadership inside Gaza aimed to maintain the achieved position, the leadership in the 
West Bank seemed to be more moderate in order to minimize the PA’s actions against the 
West Bank Hamas.375 In contrast to that, the external leadership tried to regain its overall 
influence.376 While the new situation made internal Hamas decision making more 
complex and no longer a competition between hardliners and moderates only, it did not 
indicate a split in the movement.377 Overall, the new position in the Gaza Strip favored 
Hamas as a whole because it secured Hamas’ influence in the Palestinian situation. Even 
if the leadership were divided concerning the priority of objectives, the movement would 
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be able to sustain its center of gravity and would not need to deviate from its identity. 
Although its political signals for cooperation, reconciliation and the truce were not in 
total agreement with its charter, Hamas still proved to be a resistance movement. In 
contrast to the PA and against the isolation it represents the just cause of the 
Palestinians.378 Additionally, the movement’s sustainability depends on all parts of the 
movement.379  
To sum up, Hamas succeeded in consolidating its powers. Even if the leadership 
was divided about the priority of objectives or the further course of action, the movement 
maintained its cohesion and manifested itself as a political power. Although not 
necessarily an unambiguous decision, the further course of events, the continued isolation 
and the deteriorating situation in Palestine narrowed the further options down to violence. 
2. The Road to Operation “Cast Lead” 
It is important to remember that Hamas’ actions when making decisions always 
include the objective to maintain or improve its position. In order to do so, Hamas now 
includes the opportunities of political participation into its assessments. Originally 
formed to participate in the armed resistance, Hamas developed and included political 
participation, as the analysis of the previous cases showed. It used political participation 
when it contributed to the movement’s position but also referred to violence when that 
supported the organization’s course of action. While the leadership was either restricted 
to moderate behavior or willing to engage in politics, incentives given by circumstances 
finally influenced the decision to refer to violence or politics. 
Concerning the situation in Palestine, two facts that led to the escalations and 
military operation at the end of 2008 are of importance. First, the declining public support 
by the population for Hamas and second, the ongoing isolation combined with the 
deteriorating situation on the ground along with the stalemate of any political process. 
Additionally, Israel’s position contributed to the renewed outbreak of fighting because it 
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had to react to the renewed rocket attacks and had already planned to crack down on 
Hamas in order to deter it and to degrade its military capabilities.380 
As shown, the situation after the 2006 elections and the takeover made political 
participation impossible. Initially Hamas had the intent to participate in politics.381 The 
reaction of the international community, Israel, and the PA also prevented this.382 As 
shown in the previous analysis of the consolidation of power, this minimized the options 
for both approaches, hardliners as well as moderates. Hamas as a whole needed to 
consolidate its power. This was successful. But, to maintain the position it had achieved, 
it needed to prove the ability to provide governance to the Gaza Strip, which included 
meeting basic needs. This was the crucial goal Hamas needed to fulfill in order to 
maintain public support. While Hamas managed to establish law and order383  it was 
unable to cope with the isolation.384 The inability to provide support for basic needs 
forced Hamas to act. An extension of the truce would have been one option because it 
would have helped to further manifest Hamas’ power position and would have been 
supported by the public.385 Nonetheless, to maintain its political position, an extended 
truce needed to include an end of the isolation. The end of the isolation had been a 
demand since Hamas agreed on the truce in July 2008. Otherwise, an extension would 
have only proved Hamas unable to govern.386 There are indications, however, that this 
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option was considered by Hamas and that an extension would have been possible.387 
Still, the prospect that the isolation would continue, further deteriorate the situation on 
the ground and further erode public support favored a hardliner reaction. Concerning its 
political position, Hamas had a stance of: “let us govern, or watch us fight.”388 
Politically, Hamas could have gained from the end of the isolation, but not from a 
moderation of its position. As a Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip put it: “…between 
fighting and opening the crossings, we will choose the latter. But between surrender and 
fighting, we will fight.”389 Hamas assessed the second option, new militant clashes with 
Israel, as a contributor to its position.390 Hamas’ decision to increase the pressure on 
Israel with renewed rocket attacks was aimed either on an opening of the borders or an 
Israeli military response.391 Dealing with a military operation was easier for Hamas than 
coping with the critiques of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.392 The decision to take the 
risk of an Israeli operation was supported by the fact that Israel adhered to its practice of 
isolation and its willingness to operate against Hamas. Moreover, an attack against 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip could reverse the decline of public support because an attack 
could be interpreted as an operation against Palestinians in general and could initiate 
“emotional identification” with Hamas.393 Initial reports from the first week of the Israeli 
operation indicate that, in fact, public support swung back in favor of Hamas, at least to 
some extent.394 Furthermore, Hamas could maintain or probably improve its position in 
Palestine, if it could withstand the Israeli operation following the example of the 
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Hezbollah in Lebanon.395 Both, Israel and Hamas did not intentionally aim for a new 
escalation.396 But, the different understandings of the truce bolstered the decisions for 
military actions. Hamas expected the truce to lead to an opening of the borders.397 This 
did not happen, so it looked for the military option as explained. As the reports during the 
operation indicated, Hamas remained operational. Although the force of the Israeli 
operation was unexpected, Hamas was not unprepared.398 During the operation, Hamas 
was able to continue limited rocket attacks and even to maintain law and order, to some 
extent.399 Israel saw the truce as a modular option for more openness or more isolation 
and further military response depending on the calm and Galit Shalit’s release.400 
Therefore, Israel prepared the operation thoroughly.401 
In the course of events, Hamas’ assessment proved to be correct. The Israeli 
operation increased public support for resistance and revenge, which contributed to 
Hamas’ overall stance.402 Additionally, international response was against the Israeli 
operation, accusing the Israelis of excessive use of force.403 The media coverage 
internationalized the escalation and increased the international pressure for a ceasefire as 
well as the demand for Palestinian reconciliation and new peace talks.404 This further 
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contributed to Hamas’ position because it kept Hamas in “the game” as a political power 
and Hamas was able to set the stage for renewed negotiations.405 In contrast, the PA and 
Abbas suffered a blow because they proved to be unable to stop the escalation or to 
protect the Palestinians.406 Hamas used “the war for political and internal leverage, 
because the organization has already achieved its objectives in terms of deterrence.”407 
Three facts can be learned from the road to the latest escalation. First, even if 
tensions increased between the leadership, Hamas maintained its cohesion. Second, 
Hamas’ leadership followed the same decision-making pattern as in other situations. This 
situation offered no incentives to participate in politics. Moreover, domestic and 
international response favored resistance. Therefore, Hamas’ assessment was that 
pragmatic politics would not contribute to the movement’s cause. Third, this favored the 
hardliners in the movement and made violence more likely. 
3. The Aftermath of Operation “Cast Lead” 
Israel ended operation “Cast Lead,” declared a truce and withdraw its last troops 
from the Gaza Strip on January 21, 2009. This ended the latest apex of the escalation in 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While Israel claims that Hamas suffered a decisive blow 
during the operations, Hamas declares itself as victorious.408 The events are in still in 
flow. The negotiated truce was shaken by renewed clashes of Hamas operatives and 
Israeli forces at the end of January.409 Meanwhile, the envoys of the U.S. and the 
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Europeans are back in the Middle East engaging the opposing parties. The damage 
assessment is still ongoing, but a first assessment can be made about Hamas’ situation. 
The exact damage Israel inflicted on Hamas is still not known, but taking into 
consideration the number and intensity of attacks, the targets, and the visible destruction 
it can be assessed that at least Hamas’ own infrastructure and the Gaza administrative 
infrastructure were affected significantly.410 Nonetheless, the assessment is not that 
unambiguous. Indeed, it seems that Hamas reached its objectives, at least partially. 
Although it suffered a blowback in its capability to govern the Gaza Strip, Hamas still 
rules the Gaza Strip, has remained in power, and still has a close grip on law and 
order.411 Politically, Hamas remains operational, too. Its leadership in the Gaza Strip, as 
well as the exile leadership, is active and again engaged in negotiations and 
discussions.412 Concerning its domestic position, Hamas is strengthened because it 
simply withstood the Israeli operation. Due to that fact, Hamas secured its position as a 
political force, which has to be integrated into further peace and reconciliation talks.413 
While the impact on Hamas’ opponent, Fatah, is not yet clear either, it can be assessed as 
being weakened. Neither Fatah nor Abbas were able to play a major role in ending the 
conflict, which presents them as weak, nor is the PA able to take back authority in the 
Gaza Strip.414 Concerning Fatah’s internal division, reactions during the operation 
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indicate that operation “Cast Lead” rather increased Fatah’s internal tensions than 
improved the organization’s stand.415 As can be seen in the previous examples, a 
weakened Fatah favors Hamas.  
Besides the fact that Hamas was able to maintain and at least partially improve its 
position in Palestine, it also improved its political stance. The renewed attempts to revive 
the peace talks are also in favor for Hamas. The international approach is to end the 
isolation of the Gaza Strip, which was one of Hamas’ objectives that can be exploited.416 
Furthermore, as a matter of fact, with Hamas still in control of the Gaza Strip, all support 
or help for Gaza has to deal with the administration, thereby keeping Gaza and Hamas in 
the loop.417 Besides that, Middle East leaders have already demanded the inclusion of 
Hamas in further talks to bolster reconciliation and improve the peace process; the 
approach of the Middle East Quartet is, at least, under discussion.418 Hamas’ leaders have 
already responded to these changed political conditions and declared their willingness for 
cooperation and talks.419 This indicates that the situation after operation “Cast Lead” 
provides some incentives for Hamas to reengage in politics. Still in power, with the 
isolation no longer sustainable, and a changing international approach, Hamas can 
reengage in politics under conditions that are more favorable. Hamas can claim a victory 
in the latest escalation and add some conditions to the negotiations. Furthermore, it can 
reengage in politics without turning away from its Charter. Although the acceptance of a  
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long truce is not in conjunction with its Charter, Hamas can claim that it represents the 
just Palestinian cause, as it did after the 2006 elections or the takeover of the Gaza 
Strip.420  
Hamas also maintained support by the public. Although there are voices against 
Hamas and its victory rally was left unattended421 the public, in general, tends to have 
shifted towards resistance, and support for Hamas seems to be at least the same.422 
Nonetheless, this poses a challenge to Hamas. While still in power in the Gaza Strip, it 
needs to govern. This includes quick relief for the population and a quick start to 
reconstruction. Due to the fact that major parts of the administration infrastructure are 
destroyed and international help is still slow and still reluctant to approach Hamas, this is 
a major challenge.423 Public support for Hamas strongly depends on how fast the group 
can provide relief.  
Hamas achieved its objectives, but at the same time suffered a blow. Compared 
with the previous cases, this can indicate another shift of Hamas’ internal momentum. 
This is a situation in which the momentum lies with the more moderate leadership 
because there is the prospect that political participation can pay off. Also, the military 
capabilities are limited due to losses and the missing legitimacy for continued violence. 
That the momentum is with the leadership, which is open to political participation, is 
indicated by statements of Ismail Haniyeh and even Khaled Mishal who is assessed as a 
hardliner.424 How this situation is influenced by the death of two of Hamas’ senior 
leaders, Said Siam and Nizar Rayyan, cannot yet be assessed. It is likely that the new 
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situation can minimize tensions between the leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. Both sides can benefit from renewed political participation because Hamas as a 
whole would be included. Still, tensions within the leadership remain. Hardliner elements 
are still searching for ways to continue the fighting or are arguing in this direction as the 
continued attacks and further statements from the Gaza Strip indicate.425 While tensions 
remain and can be seen as “quite normal” for the Hamas leadership, the overall current 
situation and developments indicate that Hamas’ internal momentum lies with the more 
moderate leadership. As can be seen from the period of 2006 to 2008, time is a crucial 
factor in this concern. If Hamas is to fail in governing and relieving the Gaza crisis and is 
excluded from further political talks, it is likely that the pendulum will swing back 
towards the hardliners and to renewed armed and violent resistance. 
To sum up, one can derive four facts from the latest escalation and its aftermath. 
First, Hamas’ main objective is sustaining the movement, which means it has to maintain 
its power and its position in Palestine. If the situation gives Hamas no incentive to sustain 
the movement by political participation, it fights. Thereby, it acts not blindly or 
irrationally. Hamas tries to exploit the opportunities a situation gives it. In the case of 
operation “Cast Lead,” it allowed Hamas to escape the impending failure of its 
governance in the Gaza Strip and to improve its position by withstanding the Israeli 
attack.  
Second, the leadership is divided into a hardliner faction, which is more reluctant 
to approach Fatah for reconciliation and more willing to continue the fight, and a 
moderate faction, which is more willing to approach Fatah for cooperation and to refrain 
from violence in favor of political participation. Despite their different positions, they 
have a common aim: to sustain the organization. So far, Hamas has managed to prevent a 
major split in the movement and to maintain its cohesion. Additionally, the different 
positions of the leadership prove that political participation is possible.  
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Third, the momentum between the different leaderships changes due to 
circumstances. How long the momentum lies with the moderates or the hardliners 
depends on two facts: First, are Hamas’ objectives achieved? Second, is there a major 
change in the circumstances? In the recent developments, Hamas achieved its objective 
but was in need of a new course of action. Furthermore, the circumstances under which 
Hamas had to act changed dramatically, thereby favoring political participation rather 
than continued violence.  
The fourth fact derived from this last case is the further evidence of the fact that 
Hamas continues to have situational awareness and continues to assess objectives, 




A. THE NATURE OF HAMAS 
The analysis of Hamas, its organization, and its actions shows that it is a complex 
movement rather than merely a terrorist bomb squad. This does not mean that Hamas will 
suddenly reject violence and its Charter, but it also does not mean that Hamas will always 
persist with its violence. Hamas’ toolbox includes both violence and pragmatic politics. 
As shown in Chapter II, Hamas developed as a movement with an objective. This 
objective is stated in its Charter the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic 
Palestinian state. Nonetheless, as a movement, it has another far more existential 
objective. Once established, a movement needs to sustain itself. As a first priority, its 
actions are aimed on securing the group’s survival.426 With this behavior, Hamas is not 
different from other movements.427 This is manifested in Hamas’ center of gravity. In 
order to pursue its objective, Hamas needs to protect its critical capability and to maintain 
its critical requirements. As a matter of fact, Hamas is not an isolated actor but exists 
under changing situations and circumstances. As explained, these conditions create the 
incentives and opportunities about which Hamas responds, decides, and acts. These acts 
also have repercussions for Hamas. Hamas has developed further, and more importantly, 
has learned. Chapter III shows that Hamas developed a hierarchical organization that 
allows flexible decision making and adaption to changing circumstances. As the latest 
development shows, this structure enables Hamas to maintain its organization even under 
unfavorable conditions. Chapter III showed that Hamas learned to engage and pursue its 
objectives not only by violence. Hamas also learned to act as a political power without 
adherence solely to violence. The course of events from Oslo to the 2006 elections 
clearly shows an ongoing learning process that was interrupted by the isolation imposed 
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on Hamas in 2006. This does not make Hamas a peaceful organization but shows that 
Hamas’ usage of its toolbox creates an interdependency of objectives, political 
opportunities and situational incentives and assessed opportunities. Violence or pragmatic 
politics are used after a cost benefit analysis based on different assessments. First, what is 
Hamas’ position in general: strong or weak? Second, do the given circumstances (this 
includes other actors and competitors) impose a threat to Hamas or contribute to Hamas’ 
position? Third, under the given circumstances, what are the priorities of Hamas’ 
objectives: protection of its position and power, or exploitation and improvement? 
Fourth, what are the opportunities for pragmatic politics and what are the opportunities 
for violence under the given circumstances? Fifth, what is the best option to preserve the 
center of gravity and to pursue its objectives?  Figure 4 shows a depiction of Hamas’ 
decision-making process. 
 
Figure 4: Hamas’ Decision-Making Process 
In 1987, circumstances favored resistance and the MB decided to form Hamas in 
order to improve its weakened position. In 1993, circumstances favored non-violent 
behavior and Hamas’ position was weakened by the public’s demand for peace and the 
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political dominance of its opponents. Still, defensive action was accepted by the public. 
Hamas decided to refrain from active political participation in order to preserve its 
cohesion and identity but supported individual political participation and participated in 
student and professional association elections. Furthermore, Hamas engaged in violence 
whenever it was able to legitimate it as defensive. With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa 
intifada, the situation shifted again towards resistance and Hamas engaged in violence 
with full force trying to improve its position. In 2006, with the second intifada coming to 
an end, Hamas’ position of a political opposition was good. Additionally, the public’s 
demand for peace and Hamas’ degraded militant capabilities limited Hamas violent 
options but favored pragmatic politics. As a result, Hamas engaged in political 
participation with a party, with which it was willing to cooperate. From 2006 to 2008 the 
isolation steadily degraded Hamas’ ability to govern and weakened its position. Rejected 
as a political player and facing a continuous decline in support, Hamas shifted back to 
resistance and violence in order to at least protect its achieved position and power. In the 
aftermath of operation “Cast Lead,” Hamas has been able to maintain its position. With 
degraded militant capabilities, but the isolation ended, still in power, and a new 
international engagement to the peace process, Hamas signals are pointing towards 
pragmatic politics again. 
The leadership plays an important role in decision making. As shown, there are 
different positions in the leadership, the hardliners and the moderates. Today, it seems 
that both positions can be found in different compositions in all arms of the Hamas 
organization, and in all regions: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and in exile. Figure 5 
shows the possible distribution of leadership positions and influence around March 2009. 
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Figure 5: Possible Distribution of Leadership Influence around March 2009 
The examples in Chapter III show that there are tensions between the different 
leadership positions, and because of circumstances of the regional leadership, about the 
particular course of action of the movement. So far, this has not led to any splits in the 
movement because the different positions are united by a paramount common objective 
of maintaining Hamas’ position and common dependencies on the organizational 
structure as a whole. Still, the leadership position of the moment has to be taken into 
consideration when assessing Hamas’ objectives. As can be seen by the examples, in 
general, the leadership which dominates influences the course of action: the moderates 
towards more political participation and the hardliners towards more militant action. 
Thereby, the leadership depends on the circumstances. If opportunities for political 
participation increase and the overall situation is contra-violent, the moderates are 
bolstered which makes pragmatic politics more likely. In contrast to that, pressure and 
counteraction combined with a situation that favors resistance, bolster the hardliners, 
making violence more likely. It is important to see the interrelationship between situation, 
leadership, and decision making, because this relationship must be understood when 
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approaching Hamas. Additionally, the time factor has to be considered. As the situation 
on the ground develops, it creates a window of opportunity either for pragmatic politics 
or violence. Concerning the leadership, a further fact is of importance, too. As can be 
seen from the internal discussions prior to the decisions in the 2006 elections and the 
latest events, the leadership is also learning, refining its political tools while sustaining 
the militant tools as well. 
The organization, its members, and its leadership are developing, learning, and 
adapting. Hamas’ problem is that its identity as a resistance movement which fights for 
the just cause of all Palestinians is bound to its Charter which remains a 1988 document. 
In order to sustain the movement, Hamas adapted to changing circumstances thereby 
deviating in its actions from the written words of its Charter, as shown in the examples. 
Due to the fact that this circumstantial adaptation is necessary to survive, this deviation 
from the Charter is accepted and explained by the leadership. At the same time, this 
limits Hamas’ possibilities in its political practice. It cannot directly accept the Israeli 
state in an announcement prior to negotiations, as demanded by the Middle East Quartet, 
because it will lose its identity and lead itself to absurdity.428 Due to this fact, Hamas has 
adopted an indirect approach to engaging in politics. Hamas’ willingness to discuss a 
long term truce and border issues allows Hamas to engage in politics and de facto accept 
Israel by making it a partner in negotiations. At the same time, Hamas prevents the public 
rejection of the core of its identity. While Hamas, as a whole, is a rational actor, its 
charter is a historical but still necessary artifact. It is important to understand this self 
imposed limitation in Hamas’ practice because it shows a possible approach towards 
Hamas. 
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B. HOW TO APPROACH HAMAS? 
In general, the situation on the ground leaves politics with three options.  
Option number one is the rejection of Hamas as a political adversary and the 
attempt to marginalize or even eliminate it by isolation and military means. The examples 
in Chapter III show that military force against Hamas can contain but not neutralize the 
organization. The same account can be given to the isolation approach from 2006 to 
2008. Both attempts proved to be unsuccessful. As shown in Chapter I, the supporters of 
the two attempts argue that political inclusion of Hamas will fail because the group is 
bound to violence. As seen in the case analyses, this assessment is incorrect. As a matter 
of fact, this option cannot achieve any progress in the peace process and will rather 
further deteriorate the situation and hamper any peace efforts because it neither deals 
with Hamas’ nature nor with the circumstances on the ground. 
Any lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must include all political 
and social powers and this means also with Hamas.429 Moreover, inner Palestinian 
reconciliation must be achieved as a precondition for peace.430 Therefore, the other two 
options aim for an inclusion of Hamas in politics. Recent studies show that inclusion can 
moderate extremists, even if it is not in a democratic system.431 While this does not 
necessarily mean that a movement undergoes complete transformation at once, it shows 
that the process can work. Although the process needs time, it can be at least initiated.  
In option number two, Hamas is accepted as a political partner and included in the 
political system and the negotiations without any conditions. Option two responds to the 
situation on the ground and to Hamas as a political power. The unconditional inclusion 
allows engaging the necessary reconciliation between the Fatah and Hamas and the 
pursuit of the two-state solution simultaneously. It copes with Hamas’ readiness to accept 
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the two-state solution.432 The inclusion of Hamas without any conditions allows Hamas 
to succeed with political participation. This gives a strong incentive for Hamas to refrain 
from violence because political participation is supported by its members and the public, 
whereas violence is more difficult to legitimize while engaged in politics. Nonetheless, 
this option can be costly because of two reasons.  
First, it is risky for European and Western politicians to negotiate with Hamas. 
Hamas is still assessed as a terrorist organization. Therefore, an engagement is difficult 
because it is contrary to agreed political decisions and has to counter strong lobbies 
which support option one.433 Moreover, there is no guarantee that Hamas will stay 
peaceful. To negotiate with a group that might engage in violence against civilians again 
can damage the reputation of politicians.  
 A second risk concern Hamas itself. At first glance, the unconditional inclusion 
fosters the moderate factions in Hamas, willing to engage in political participation. But, 
in the long run, this approach can marginalize the moderates because it allows Hamas’ 
hardliners to argue that they achieved political legitimization without any concessions or 
altering of the movement’s character. This strengthening of the hardliners implies the risk 
of renewed violence in case negotiations reach another stalemate. 
This thesis recommends a third option. It includes Hamas in an indirect approach. 
Simultaneously, it aims to create conditions that make it strategically attractive for 
Hamas to abandon violence and accept a two-state solution. Thereby, it gives Hamas the 
incentive to redefine resistance, away from violence toward political opposition. 
Hamas and the situation on the ground are more comparable to Northern Ireland 
and the IRA than to Al-Qaeda’s global jihad.434 Hamas is in a similar political position to 
the IRA and the situation on the ground is comparable, too.435 “We made a different 
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analysis. Firstly, that the war could not be won. Secondly, that there could be no long-
term solution to the problem we were confronting without the eventual involvement of 
those we were fighting. Thirdly, that even as the fighting continued we needed to find a 
means of engaging them. And fourthly, that this could only be done by opening 
dialogue.”436 This approach is also applicable in Palestine. Thereby, it is important to 
understand Hamas’ political limitations which are similar to those of the IRA.437 
Therefore, the new approach should be an “exploratory dialogue.”438 Rather than 
applying demands or preconditions which Hamas cannot cope with, an exploratory 
dialogue would help create a base for further negotiations. Moreover, it could initiate the 
inclusion of Hamas in the political process and “keep them in the play.” As the lessons 
from Northern Ireland show, such a “non-committal dialogue” which should be started on 
a low profile level offers the chance of more progress than forced commitments, which 
cannot be met by one of the parties.439 This would give Hamas the necessary incentives 
for further pragmatic politics. While understanding Hamas’ character, small advances 
such as an agreed long-term truce, or reopened borders should be the focus, rather than 
immediate settlement of the overall Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The non-public, non-
committing talks would be a response to Hamas’ willingness to participate in politics and 
open the opportunity to bolster the moderates in Fatah and the PA which may increase 
the chances for a Palestinian reconciliation and the successful establishment of a unity 
government. Furthermore, the immediate inclusion allows maintaining law and order in 
the Gaza Strip and preventing other radical groups from carrying out violence against 
Israel. This allows progress in the inner Palestinian situation, and the manifestation of 
Hamas’ inclusion in the political system. Strategically, it would be attractive for Hamas 
to abandon violence under these circumstances because further violence would damage 
its legitimacy and position rather than contributing to its position and public support. 
Additionally, the approach allows Hamas to initiate the process to redefine resistance 
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away from violence to non-violent political means by itself, rather than responding to 
external pressure which could be assessed as a threat to its identity. 
Nonetheless, under current circumstances, this approach is difficult to apply. 
While the truce is shaky and Israel is prepared to re-launch operations, the application of 
this non-committal dialogue approach must not only include Israel but at the same time 
bring relief to the Gaza Strip and reopen the borders. Although difficult, the situation 
gives incentives for this approach: Hamas showing willingness for political talks and its 
militant capabilities are degraded, but still maintaining power. A new U.S. government is 
in the lead and initiated the first steps to revive the peace process. The Middle East 
Quartet is mutually convinced that a new approach to the conflict is necessary. Last but 
not least, the situation on the ground in the Gaza Strip demands a quick disaster relief 
response which must deal with Hamas. These facts create the opportunity for a new 
approach and the possibility for preventing the mistakes of the past. Military force, 
deterrence and ignorance of facts on the ground cannot solve a political conflict. In this 
political conflict, Hamas remains a political power which needs to be included in the 
peace process. With its election victory in 2006, Hamas changed the political conditions 
in Palestine.440 Furthermore, Hamas implemented itself as a powerful factor in the 
Palestinian society and the political system.441 Thereby, Hamas has proved to be a 
rational actor. Although Hamas is willing to use violence, its inclusion in a political 
process is possible. As the examples show, the latest events have opened a window of 
opportunity for this approach. Nonetheless, the examples also show that this window can 
close again. 
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V. APPENDIX 
A. TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
 
Figure 6: Timeline of Events until 2009 
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B. HAMAS’ CHARTER 
Hamas’ charter was accessed on the website of the Yale Law School Lillian 
Goldman library.442 
Hamas Covenant 1988 
The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement  
18 August 1988 
In The Name Of The Most Merciful Allah  
Ye are the best nation that hath been raised up unto mankind: ye command 
that which is just, and ye forbid that which is unjust, and ye believe in 
Allah. And if they who have received the scriptures had believed, it had 
surely been the better for them: there are believers among them, but the 
greater part of them are transgressors. They shall not hurt you, unless with 
a slight hurt; and if they fight against you, they shall turn their backs to 
you, and they shall not be helped. They are smitten with vileness 
wheresoever they are found; unless they obtain security by entering into a 
treaty with Allah, and a treaty with men; and they draw on themselves 
indignation from Allah, and they are afflicted with poverty. This they 
suffer, because they disbelieved the signs of Allah, and slew the prophets 
unjustly; this, because they were rebellious, and transgressed. 
(Al-Imran–verses 109-111).  
Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it 
obliterated others before it" (The Martyr, Imam Hassan al-Banna, of blessed memory).  
"The Islamic world is on fire. Each of us should pour some water, no matter how 
little, to extinguish whatever one can without waiting for the others." (Sheikh Amjad al-
Zahawi, of blessed memory).  
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In The Name Of The Most Merciful Allah  
Introduction 
Praise be unto Allah, to whom we resort for help, and whose forgiveness, guidance and 
support we seek; Allah bless the Prophet and grant him salvation, his companions and 
supporters, and to those who carried out his message and adopted his laws–everlasting 
prayers and salvation as long as the earth and heaven will last. Hereafter:  
O People: 
Out of the midst of troubles and the sea of suffering, out of the palpitations of faithful 
hearts and cleansed arms; out of the sense of duty, and in response to Allah's command, 
the call has gone out rallying people together and making them follow the ways of Allah, 
leading them to have determined will in order to fulfill their role in life, to overcome all 
obstacles, and surmount the difficulties on the way. Constant preparation has continued 
and so has the readiness to sacrifice life and all that is precious for the sake of Allah.  
Thus it was that the nucleus (of the movement) was formed and started to pave its 
way through the tempestuous sea of hopes and expectations, of wishes and yearnings, of 
troubles and obstacles, of pain and challenges, both inside and outside.  
When the idea was ripe, the seed grew and the plant struck root in the soil of 
reality, away from passing emotions, and hateful haste. The Islamic Resistance 
Movement emerged to carry out its role through striving for the sake of its Creator, its 
arms intertwined with those of all the fighters for the liberation of Palestine. The spirits of 
its fighters meet with the spirits of all the fighters who have sacrificed their lives on the 
soil of Palestine, ever since it was conquered by the companions of the Prophet, Allah 
bless him and grant him salvation, and until this day.  
This Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), clarifies its 
picture, reveals its identity, outlines its stand, explains its aims, speaks about its hopes, 
and calls for its support, adoption and joining its ranks. Our struggle against the Jews is 
very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step that inevitably should 
be followed by other steps. The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported 
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by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is 
vanquished and Allah's victory is realized.  
Thus we see them coming on the horizon "and you shall learn about it hereafter" 
"Allah hath written, Verily I will prevail, and my apostles: for Allah is strong and 
mighty." (The Dispute–verse 21).  
"Say to them, This is my way: I invite you to Allah, by an evident demonstration; 
both I and he who followeth me; and, praise be unto Allah! I am not an idolator." 
(Joseph–verse 107).  
Hamas (means) strength and bravery -(according to) Al-Mua'jam al-Wasit: 
c1. 
Definition of the Movement  
Ideological Starting-Points  
Article One: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement: The Movement's programme is Islam. From 
it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man. It 
resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for guidance of its 
steps.  
The Islamic Resistance Movement's Relation With the Moslem Brotherhood 
Group:  
Article Two: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in 
Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes 
the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterised by its deep 
understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts 
of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and 
judgement, the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and 
conversion to Islam.  
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Structure and Formation  
Article Three: 
The basic structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement consists of Moslems who 
have given their allegiance to Allah whom they truly worship,—"I have created the jinn 
and humans only for the purpose of worshipping"—who know their duty towards 
themselves, their families and country. In all that, they fear Allah and raise the banner of 
Jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they would rid the land and the people of their 
uncleanliness, vileness and evils.  
"But we will oppose truth to vanity, and it shall confound the same; and behold, it 
shall vanish away." (Prophets–verse 18). 
Article Four: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement welcomes every Moslem who embraces its 
faith, ideology, follows its programme, keeps its secrets, and wants to belong to its ranks 
and carry out the duty. Allah will certainly reward such one.  
Time and Place Extent of the Islamic Resistance Movement:  
Article Five: 
Time extent of the Islamic Resistance Movement: By adopting Islam as its way of 
life, the Movement goes back to the time of the birth of the Islamic message, of the 
righteous ancestor, for Allah is its target, the Prophet is its example and the Koran is its 
constitution. Its extent in place is anywhere that there are Moslems who embrace Islam as 
their way of life everywhere in the globe. This being so, it extends to the depth of the 
earth and reaches out to the heaven.  
"Dost thou not see how Allah putteth forth a parable; representing a good word, as 
a good tree, whose root is firmly fixed in the earth, and whose branches reach unto 
heaven; which bringeth forth its fruit in all seasons, by the will of its Lord? Allah 
propoundeth parables unto men, that they may be instructed." (Abraham–verses 24-25). 
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Characteristics and Independence:  
Article Six: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, 
whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner 
of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all 
religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are 
concerned. In the absence of Islam, strife will be rife, oppression spreads, evil prevails 
and schisms and wars will break out.  
How excellent was the Moslem poet, Mohamed Ikbal, when he wrote:  
"If faith is lost, there is no security and there is no life for him who does not 
adhere to religion. He who accepts life without religion, has taken annihilation as his 
companion for life." 
The Universality of the Islamic Resistance Movement:  
Article Seven: 
As a result of the fact that those Moslems who adhere to the ways of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement spread all over the world, rally support for it and its stands, strive 
towards enhancing its struggle, the Movement is a universal one. It is well-equipped for 
that because of the clarity of its ideology, the nobility of its aim and the loftiness of its 
objectives.  
On this basis, the Movement should be viewed and evaluated, and its role be 
recognised. He who denies its right, evades supporting it and turns a blind eye to facts, 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, would awaken to see that events have overtaken 
him and with no logic to justify his attitude. One should certainly learn from past 
examples.  
The injustice of next-of-kin is harder to bear than the smite of the Indian sword.  
We have also sent down unto thee the book of the Koran with truth, 
confirming that scripture which was revealed before it; and preserving the 
same safe from corruption. Judge therefore between them according to 
that which Allah hath revealed; and follow not their desires, by swerving 
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from the truth which hath come unto thee. Unto every of you have we 
given a law, and an open path; and if Allah had pleased, he had surely 
made you one people; but he hath thought it fit to give you different laws, 
that he might try you in that which he hath given you respectively. 
Therefore strive to excel each other in good works; unto Allah shall ye all 
return, and then will he declare unto you that concerning which ye have 
disagreed.  
(The Table, verse 48). 
The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the links in the chain of the struggle 
against the Zionist invaders. It goes back to 1939, to the emergence of the martyr Izz al-
Din al Kissam and his brethren the fighters, members of Moslem Brotherhood. It goes on 
to reach out and become one with another chain that includes the struggle of the 
Palestinians and Moslem Brotherhood in the 1948 war and the Jihad operations of the 
Moslem Brotherhood in 1968 and after.  
Moreover, if the links have been distant from each other and if obstacles, placed 
by those who are the lackeys of Zionism in the way of the fighters obstructed the 
continuation of the struggle, the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to the realisation 
of Allah's promise, no matter how long that should take. The Prophet, Allah bless him 
and grant him salvation, has said:  
"The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing 
the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say 
O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad 
tree, (evidently a certain kind of tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of 
the Jews." (related by al-Bukhari and Moslem). 
The Slogan of the Islamic Resistance Movement:  
Article Eight: 
Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its 
path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.  
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Objectives  
Incentives and Objectives:  
Article Nine: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement found itself at a time when Islam has 
disappeared from life. Thus rules shook, concepts were upset, values changed and evil 
people took control, oppression and darkness prevailed, cowards became like tigers: 
homelands were usurped, people were scattered and were caused to wander all over the 
world, the state of justice disappeared and the state of falsehood replaced it. Nothing 
remained in its right place. Thus, when Islam is absent from the arena, everything 
changes. From this state of affairs the incentives are drawn.  
As for the objectives: They are the fighting against the false, defeating it and 
vanquishing it so that justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved and from its mosques 
would the voice of the mu'azen emerge declaring the establishment of the state of Islam, 
so that people and things would return each to their right places and Allah is our helper.  
"...and if Allah had not prevented men, the one by the other, verily the earth had 
been corrupted: but Allah is beneficient towards his creatures." (The Cow–verse 251). 
Article Ten: 
As the Islamic Resistance Movement paves its way, it will back the oppressed and 
support the wronged with all its might. It will spare no effort to bring about justice and 
defeat injustice, in word and deed, in this place and everywhere it can reach and have 
influence therein.  
Strategies and Methods  
Strategies of the Islamic Resistance Movement: Palestine Is Islamic aqf:  
Article Eleven: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic 
Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of 
it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single 
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Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and 
presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess 
the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem 
generations until Judgement Day. This being so, who could claim to have the right to 
represent Moslem generations till Judgement Day?  
This is the law governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia (law) and the 
same goes for any land the Moslems have conquered by force, because during the times 
of (Islamic) conquests, the Moslems consecrated these lands to Moslem generations till 
the Day of Judgement.  
It happened like this: When the leaders of the Islamic armies conquered Syria and 
Iraq, they sent to the Caliph of the Moslems, Umar bin-el-Khatab, asking for his advice 
concerning the conquered land—whether they should divide it among the soldiers, or 
leave it for its owners, or what? After consultations and discussions between the Caliph 
of the Moslems, Omar bin-el-Khatab and companions of the Prophet, Allah bless him and 
grant him salvation, it was decided that the land should be left with its owners who could 
benefit by its fruit. As for the real ownership of the land and the land itself, it should be 
consecrated for Moslem generations till Judgement Day. Those who are on the land, are 
there only to benefit from its fruit. This Waqf remains as long as earth and heaven 
remain. Any procedure in contradiction to Islamic Sharia, where Palestine is concerned, 
is null and void.  
"Verily, this is a certain truth. Wherefore praise the name of thy Lord, the great 
Allah." (The Inevitable–verse 95). 
Homeland and Nationalism from the Point of View of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement in Palestine:  
Article Twelve: 
Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part 
of the religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the 
case when an enemy should tread Moslem land. Resisting and quelling the enemy  
 
 110
become the individual duty of every Moslem, male or female. A woman can go out to 
fight the enemy without her husband's permission, and so does the slave: without his 
master's permission.  
Nothing of the sort is to be found in any other regime. This is an undisputed fact. 
If other nationalist movements are connected with materialistic, human or regional 
causes, nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement has all these elements as well as 
the more important elements that give it soul and life. It is connected to the source of 
spirit and the granter of life, hoisting in the sky of the homeland the heavenly banner that 
joins earth and heaven with a strong bond.  
If Moses comes and throws his staff, both witch and magic are annulled.  
"Now is the right direction manifestly distinguished from deceit: whoever 
therefore shall deny Tagut, and believe in Allah, he shall surely take hold with a strong 
handle, which shall not be broken; Allah is he who heareth and seeth." (The Cow–Verse 
256). 
Peaceful Solutions, Initiatives and International Conferences:  
Article Thirteen: 
Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in 
contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of 
Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion. Nationalism of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement is part of its religion. Its members have been fed on that. For the sake of 
hoisting the banner of Allah over their homeland they fight. "Allah will be prominent, but 
most people do not know."  
Now and then the call goes out for the convening of an international conference to 
look for ways of solving the (Palestinian) question. Some accept, others reject the idea, 
for this or other reason, with one stipulation or more for consent to convening the 
conference and participating in it. Knowing the parties constituting the conference, their 
past and present attitudes towards Moslem problems, the Islamic Resistance Movement 
does not consider these conferences capable of realising the demands, restoring the rights 
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or doing justice to the oppressed. These conferences are only ways of setting the infidels 
in the land of the Moslems as arbitraters. When did the infidels do justice to the 
believers?  
"But the Jews will not be pleased with thee, neither the Christians, until thou 
follow their religion; say, The direction of Allah is the true direction. And verily if thou 
follow their desires, after the knowledge which hath been given thee, thou shalt find no 
patron or protector against Allah." (The Cow–verse 120). 
There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, 
proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. The 
Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate 
toyed with. As in said in the honourable Hadith:  
"The people of Syria are Allah's lash in His land. He wreaks His vengeance 
through them against whomsoever He wishes among His slaves It is unthinkable that 
those who are double-faced among them should prosper over the faithful. They will 
certainly die out of grief and desperation." 
The Three Circles:  
Article Fourteen: 
The question of the liberation of Palestine is bound to three circles: the Palestinian 
circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle. Each of these circles has its role in the 
struggle against Zionism. Each has its duties, and it is a horrible mistake and a sign of 
deep ignorance to overlook any of these circles. Palestine is an Islamic land which has the 
first of the two kiblahs (direction to which Moslems turn in praying), the third of the holy 
(Islamic) sanctuaries, and the point of departure for Mohamed's midnight journey to the 
seven heavens (i.e. Jerusalem).  
"Praise be unto him who transported his servant by night, from the sacred temple 
of Mecca to the farther temple of Jerusalem, the circuit of which we have blessed, that we 
might show him some of our signs; for Allah is he who heareth, and seeth." (The Night-
Journey–verse 1). 
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Since this is the case, liberation of Palestine is then an individual duty for very 
Moslem wherever he may be. On this basis, the problem should be viewed. This should 
be realized by every Moslem.  
The day the problem is dealt with on this basis, when the three circles mobilize 
their capabilities, the present state of affairs will change and the day of liberation will 
come nearer.  
"Verily ye are stronger than they, by reason of the terror cast into their breasts 
from Allah. This, because they are not people of prudence." (The Emigration–verse 13). 
The Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine is an Individual Duty:  
Article Fifteen: 
The day that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual 
duty of every Moslem. In face of the Jews' usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that 
the banner of Jihad be raised. To do this requires the diffusion of Islamic consciousness 
among the masses, both on the regional, Arab and Islamic levels. It is necessary to instill 
the spirit of Jihad in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the enemies and 
join the ranks of the fighters.  
It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media 
people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic 
movements, should take part in the operation of awakening (the masses). It is important 
that basic changes be made in the school curriculum, to cleanse it of the traces of 
ideological invasion that affected it as a result of the orientalists and missionaries who 
infiltrated the region following the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salah el-Din 
(Saladin). The Crusaders realized that it was impossible to defeat the Moslems without 
first having ideological invasion pave the way by upsetting their thoughts, disfiguring 
their heritage and violating their ideals. Only then could they invade with soldiers. This, 
in its turn, paved the way for the imperialistic invasion that made Allenby declare on 
entering Jerusalem: "Only now have the Crusades ended." General Guru stood at Salah 
el-Din's grave and said: "We have returned, O Salah el-Din." Imperialism has helped 
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towards the strengthening of ideological invasion, deepening, and still does, its roots. All 
this has paved the way towards the loss of Palestine.  
It is necessary to instill in the minds of the Moslem generations that the 
Palestinian problem is a religious problem, and should be dealt with on this basis. 
Palestine contains Islamic holy sites. In it there is al- Aqsa Mosque which is bound to the 
great Mosque in Mecca in an inseparable bond as long as heaven and earth speak of Isra` 
(Mohammed's midnight journey to the seven heavens) and Mi'raj (Mohammed's 
ascension to the seven heavens from Jerusalem).  
"The bond of one day for the sake of Allah is better than the world and whatever 
there is on it. The place of one's whip in Paradise is far better than the world and 
whatever there is on it. A worshipper's going and coming in the service of Allah is better 
than the world and whatever there is on it." (As related by al-Bukhari, Moslem, al-
Tarmdhi and Ibn Maja). 
"I swear by the holder of Mohammed's soul that I would like to invade and be 
killed for the sake of Allah, then invade and be killed, and then invade again and be 
killed." (As related by al-Bukhari and Moslem). 
The Education of the Generations:  
Article Sixteen: 
It is necessary to follow Islamic orientation in educating the Islamic generations 
in our region by teaching the religious duties, comprehensive study of the Koran, the 
study of the Prophet's Sunna (his sayings and doings), and learning about Islamic history 
and heritage from their authentic sources. This should be done by  specialized and 
learned people, using a curriculum that would healthily form the thoughts and faith of the 
Moslem student. Side by side with this, a comprehensive study of the enemy, his human 
and financial capabilities, learning about his points of weakness and strength, and getting 
to know the forces supporting and helping him, should also be included. Also, it is 
important to be acquainted with the current events, to follow what is new and to study the 
analysis and commentaries made of these events. Planning for the present and future, 
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studying every trend appearing, is a must so that the fighting Moslem would live 
knowing his aim, objective and his way in the midst of what is going on around him.  
O my son, verily every matter, whether good or bad, though it be the 
weight of a grain of mustard-seed, and be hidden in a rock, or in the 
heavens, or in the earth, Allah will bring the same to light; for Allah is 
clear-sighted and knowing. O my son, be constant at prayer, and command 
that which is just, and forbid that which is evil: and be patient under the 
afflictions which shall befall thee; for this is a duty absolutely incumbent 
on all men. Distort not thy face out of contempt to men, neither walk in 
the earth with insolence; for Allah loveth no arrogant, vain-glorious 
person.  
(Lokman–verses 16-18). 
The Role of the Moslem Woman:  
Article Seventeen: 
The Moslem woman has a role no less important than that of the moslem man in 
the battle of liberation. She is the maker of men. Her role in guiding and educating the 
new generations is great. The enemies have realized the importance of her role. They 
consider that if they are able to direct and bring her up they way they wish, far from 
Islam, they would have won the battle. That is why you find them giving these attempts 
constant attention through information campaigns, films, and the school curriculum, 
using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through Zionist organizations 
under various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, espionage groups 
and others, which are all nothing more than cells of subversion and saboteurs. These 
organizations have ample resources that enable them to play their role in societies for the 
purpose of achieving the Zionist targets and to deepen the concepts that would serve the 
enemy. These organizations operate in the absence of Islam and its estrangement among 
its people. The Islamic peoples should perform their role in confronting the conspiracies 
of these saboteurs. The day Islam is in control of guiding the affairs of life, these 





Woman in the home of the fighting family, whether she is a mother or a sister, 
plays the most important role in looking after the family, rearing the children and 
embuing them with moral values and thoughts derived from Islam. She has to teach them 
to perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of fighting awaiting them. That 
is why it is necessary to pay great attention to schools and the curriculum followed in 
educating Moslem girls, so that they would grow up to be good mothers, aware of their 
role in the battle of liberation.  
She has to be of sufficient knowledge and understanding where the performance 
of housekeeping matters are concerned, because economy and avoidance of waste of the 
family budget, is one of the requirements for the ability to continue moving forward in 
the difficult conditions surrounding us. She should put before her eyes the fact that the 
money available to her is just like blood which should never flow except through the 
veins so that both children and grown-ups could continue to live.  
Verily, the Moslems of either sex, and the true believers of either sex, and 
the devout men, and the devout women, and the men of veracity, and the 
women of veracity, and the patient men, and the patient women, and the 
humble men, and the humble women, and the alms-givers of either sex 
who remember Allah frequently; for them hath Allah prepared forgiveness 
and a great reward. 
(The Confederates–verse 25) 
The Role of Islamic Art in the Battle of Liberation:  
Article Nineteen: 
Art has regulations and measures by which it can be determined whether it is 
Islamic or pre-Islamic (Jahili) art. The issues of Islamic liberation are in need of Islamic 
art that would take the spirit high, without raising one side of human nature above the 
other, but rather raise all of them harmoniously an in equilibrium.  
Man is a unique and wonderful creature, made out of a handful of clay and a 
breath from Allah. Islamic art addresses man on this basis, while pre-Islamic art 
addresses the body giving preference to the clay component in it.  
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The book, the article, the bulletin, the sermon, the thesis, the popular poem, the 
poetic ode, the song, the play and others, contain the characteristics of Islamic art, then 
these are among the requirements of ideological mobilization, renewed food for the 
journey and recreation for the soul. The road is long and suffering is plenty. The soul will 
be bored, but Islamic art renews the energies, resurrects the movement, arousing in them 
lofty meanings and proper conduct. "Nothing can improve the self if it is in retreat except 
shifting from one mood to another."  
All this is utterly serious and no jest, for those who are fighters do not jest.  
Social Mutual Responsibility:  
Article Twenty: 
Moslem society is a mutually responsible society. The Prophet, prayers and 
greetings be unto him, said: "Blessed are the generous, whether they were in town or on a 
journey, who have collected all that they had and shared it equally among themselves."  
The Islamic spirit is what should prevail in every Moslem society. The society 
that confronts a vicious enemy which acts in a way similar to Nazism, making no 
differentiation between man and woman, between children and old people—such a 
society is entitled to this Islamic spirit. Our enemy relies on the methods of collective 
punishment. He has deprived people of their homeland and properties, pursued them in 
their places of exile and gathering, breaking bones, shooting at women, children and old 
people, with or without a reason. The enemy has opened detention camps where 
thousands and thousands of people are thrown and kept under sub-human conditions. 
Added to this, are the demolition of houses, rendering children orphans, meting cruel 
sentences against thousands of young people, and causing them to spend the best years of 
their lives in the dungeons of prisons.  
In their Nazi treatment, the Jews made no exception for women or children. Their 
policy of striking fear in the heart is meant for all. They attack people where their 
breadwinning is concerned, extorting their money and threatening their honour. They 
deal with people as if they were the worst war criminals. Deportation from the homeland 
is a kind of murder.  
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To counter these deeds, it is necessary that social mutual responsibility should 
prevail among the people. The enemy should be faced by the people as a single body 
which if one member of it should complain, the rest of the body would respond by feeling 
the same pains.  
Article Twenty-One: 
Mutual social responsibility means extending assistance, financial or moral, to all 
those who are in need and joining in the execution of some of the work. Members of the 
Islamic Resistance Movement should consider the interests of the masses as their own 
personal interests. They must spare no effort in achieving and preserving them. They 
must prevent any foul play with the future of the upcoming generations and anything that 
could cause loss to society. The masses are part of them and they are part of the masses. 
Their strength is theirs, and their future is theirs. Members of the Islamic Resistance 
Movement should share the people's joy and grief, adopt the demands of the public and 
whatever means by which they could be realised. The day that such a spirit prevails, 
brotherliness would deepen, cooperation, sympathy and unity will be enhanced and the 
ranks will be solidified to confront the enemies.  
Supportive Forces Behind the Enemy:  
Article Twenty-Two: 
For a long time, the enemies have been planning, skillfully and with precision, for 
the achievement of what they have attained. They took into consideration the causes 
affecting the current of events. They strived to amass great and substantive material 
wealth, which they devoted to the realization of their dream. With their money, they took 
control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting 
stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the 
world with the purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They 
were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the 
revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret 
societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the 
world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their 
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money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize 
many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption 
there.  
You may speak as much as you want about regional and world wars. They were 
behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, making 
financial gains and controlling resources. They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed 
the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World 
War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and 
paved the way for the establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the 
replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council 
to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, 
without having their finger in it.  
"So often as they shall kindle a fire for war, Allah shall extinguish it; and they 
shall set their minds to act corruptly in the earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers." 
(The Table–verse 64). 
The imperialistic forces in the Capitalist West and Communist East, support the 
enemy with all their might, in money and in men. These forces take turns in doing that. 
The day Islam appears, the forces of infidelity would unite to challenge it, for the infidels 
are of one nation.  
"O true believers, contract not an intimate friendship with any besides yourselves: 
they will not fail to corrupt you. They wish for that which may cause you to perish: their 
hatred hath already appeared from out of their mouths; but what their breasts conceal is 
yet more inveterate. We have already shown you signs of their ill will towards you, if ye 
understand." (The Family of Imran–verse 118). 
It is not in vain that the verse is ended with Allah's words "if ye understand."  
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Our Attitudes Towards:  
A. Islamic Movements:  
Article Twenty-Three: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement views other Islamic movements with respect 
and appreciation. If it were at variance with them on one point or opinion, it is in 
agreement with them on other points and understandings. It considers these movements, 
if they reveal good intentions and dedication to Allah, that they fall into the category of 
those who are trying hard since they act within the Islamic circle. Each active person has 
his share.  
The Islamic Resistance Movement considers all these movements as a fund for 
itself. It prays to Allah for guidance and directions for all and it spares no effort to keep 
the banner of unity raised, ever striving for its realization in accordance with the Koran 
and the Prophet's directives.  
And cleave all of you unto the covenant of Allah, and depart not from it, 
and remember the favour of Allah towards you: since ye were enemies, 
and he reconciled your hearts, and ye became companions and brethren by 
his favour: and ye were on the brink of a pit of fire, and he delivered you 
thence. Allah declareth unto you his signs, that ye may be directed.  
(The Family of Imran–Verse 102) 
Article Twenty-Four: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement does not allow slandering or speaking ill of 
individuals or groups, for the believer does not indulge in such malpractices. It is 
necessary to differentiate between this behaviour and the stands taken by certain 
individuals and groups. Whenever those stands are erroneous, the Islamic Resistance 
Movement preserves the right to expound the error and to warn against it. It will strive to 
show the right path and to judge the case in question with objectivity. Wise conduct is 
indeed the target of the believer who follows it wherever he discerns it.  
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"Allah loveth not the speaking ill of anyone in public, unless he who is injured 
call for assistance; and Allah heareth and knoweth: whether ye publish a good action, or 
conceal it, or forgive evil, verily Allah is gracious and powerful." (Women–verses 147-
148). 
B. Nationalist Movements in the Palestinian Arena:  
Article Twenty-Five: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement respects these movements and appreciates 
their circumstances and the conditions surrounding and affecting them. It encourages 
them as long as they do not give their allegiance to the Communist East or the Crusading 
West. It confirms to all those who are integrated in it, or sympathetic towards it, that the 
Islamic Resistance Movement is a fighting movement that has a moral and enlightened 
look of life and the way it should cooperate with the other (movements). It detests 
opportunism and desires only the good of people, individuals and groups alike. It does 
not seek material gains, personal fame, nor does it look for a reward from others. It works 
with its own resources and whatever is at its disposal "and prepare for them whatever 
force you can", for the fulfillment of the duty, and the earning of Allah's favour. It has no 
other desire than that.  
The Movement assures all the nationalist trends operating in the Palestinian arena 
for the liberation of Palestine, that it is there for their support and assistance. It will never 
be more than that, both in words and deeds, now and in the future. It is there to bring 
together and not to divide, to preserve and not to squander, to unify and not to throw 
asunder. It evaluates every good word, sincere effort and good offices. It closes the door 
in the face of side disagreements and does not lend an ear to rumours and slanders, while 
at the same time fully realizing the right for self-defence.  
Anything contrary or contradictory to these trends, is a lie disseminated by 
enemies or their lackeys for the purpose of sowing confusion, disrupting the ranks and 
occupy them with side issues.  
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"O true believers, if a wicked man come unto you with a tale, inquire strictly into 
the truth thereof; lest ye hurt people through ignorance, and afterwards repent of what ye 
have done." (The Inner Apartments–verse 6). 
Article Twenty-Six: 
In viewing the Palestinian nationalist movements that give allegiance neither to 
the East nor the West, in this positive way, the Islamic Resistance Movement does not 
refrain from discussing new situations on the regional or international levels where the 
Palestinian question is concerned. It does that in such an objective manner revealing the 
extent of how much it is in harmony or contradiction with the national interests in the 
light of the Islamic point of view.  
C. The Palestinian Liberation Organization:  
Article Twenty-Seven: 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization is the closest to the heart of the Islamic 
Resistance Movement. It contains the father and the brother, the next of kin and the 
friend. The Moslem does not estrange himself from his father, brother, next of kin or 
friend. Our homeland is one, our situation is one, our fate is one and the enemy is a joint 
enemy to all of us.  
Because of the situations surrounding the formation of the Organization, of the 
ideological confusion prevailing in the Arab world as a result of the ideological invasion 
under whose influence the Arab world has fallen since the defeat of the Crusaders and 
which was, and still is, intensified through orientalists, missionaries and imperialists, the 
Organization adopted the idea of the secular state. And that is how we view it.  
Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and 
decisions stem from ideologies.  
That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation 
Organization—and what it can develop into—and without belittling its role in the Arab– 
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Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the 
secular idea. The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion and whoever takes his 
religion lightly is a loser.  
"Who will be adverse to the religion of Abraham, but he whose mind is 
infatuated? (The Cow–verse 130). 
The day The Palestinian Liberation Organization adopts Islam as its way of life, 
we will become its soldiers, and fuel for its fire that will burn the enemies.  
Until such a day, and we pray to Allah that it will be soon, the Islamic Resistance 
Movement's stand towards the PLO is that of the son towards his father, the brother 
towards his brother, and the relative to relative, suffers his pain and supports him in 
confronting the enemies, wishing him to be wise and well-guided.  
"Stand by your brother, for he who is brotherless is like the fighter who goes to 
battle without arms. One's cousin is the wing one flies with—could the bird fly without 
wings?" 
D. Arab and Islamic Countries:  
Article Twenty-Eight: 
The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all 
methods, using all evil and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies greatly in its 
infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as 
the Freemasons, The Rotary and Lions clubs, and other sabotage groups. All these 
organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and according to its 
instructions. They aim at undermining societies, destroying values, corrupting 
consciences, deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and 
alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion.  
Arab countries surrounding Israel are asked to open their borders before the 
fighters from among the Arab and Islamic nations so that they could consolidate their 
efforts with those of their Moslem brethren in Palestine.  
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As for the other Arab and Islamic countries, they are asked to facilitate the 
movement of the fighters from and to it, and this is the least thing they could do.  
We should not forget to remind every Moslem that when the Jews conquered the 
Holy City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and proclaimed that 
"Mohammed is dead, and his descendants are all women."  
Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and the Moslem people. "May the 
cowards never sleep."  
E. Nationalist and Religious Groupings, Institutions, Intellectuals, The Arab 
and Islamic World:  
The Islamic Resistance Movement hopes that all these groupings will side with it 
in all spheres, would support it, adopt its stand and solidify its activities and moves, work 
towards rallying support for it so that the Islamic people will be a base and a stay for it, 
supplying it with strategic depth an all human material and informative spheres, in time 
and in place. This should be done through the convening of solidarity conferences, the 
issuing of explanatory bulletins, favourable articles and booklets, enlightening the masses 
regarding the Palestinian issue, clarifying what confronts it and the conspiracies woven 
around it. They should mobilize the Islamic nations, ideologically, educationally and 
culturally, so that these peoples would be equipped to perform their role in the decisive 
battle of liberation, just as they did when they vanquished the Crusaders and the Tatars 
and saved human civilization. Indeed, that is not difficult for Allah.  
"Allah hath written, Verily I will prevail, and my apostles: for Allah is strong and 
mighty." (The Dispute–verse 21). 
Article Thirty: 
Writers, intellectuals, media people, orators, educators and teachers, and all the 
various sectors in the Arab and Islamic world—all of them are called upon to perform 
their role, and to fulfill their duty, because of the ferocity of the Zionist offensive and the 
Zionist influence in many countries exercised through financial and media control, as 
well as the consequences that all this lead to in the greater part of the world.  
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Jihad is not confined to the carrying of arms and the confrontation of the enemy. 
The effective word, the good article, the useful book, support and solidarity—together 
with the presence of sincere purpose for the hoisting of Allah's banner higher and 
higher—all these are elements of the Jihad for Allah's sake.  
"Whosoever mobilises a fighter for the sake of Allah is himself a fighter. 
Whosoever supports the relatives of a fighter, he himself is a fighter." (related by al-
Bukhari, Moslem, Abu-Dawood and al-Tarmadhi). 
F. Followers of Other Religions: The Islamic Resistance Movement Is A 
Humanistic Movement:  
Article Thirty-One: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a humanistic movement. It takes care of 
human rights and is guided by Islamic tolerance when dealing with the followers of other 
religions. It does not antagonize anyone of them except if it is antagonized by it or stands 
in its way to hamper its moves and waste its efforts.  
Under the wing of Islam, it is possible for the followers of the three religions—
Islam, Christianity and Judaism—to coexist in peace and quiet with each other. Peace and 
quiet would not be possible except under the wing of Islam. Past and present history are 
the best witness to that.  
It is the duty of the followers of other religions to stop disputing the sovereignty 
of Islam in this region, because the day these followers should take over there will be 
nothing but carnage, displacement and terror. Everyone of them is at variance with his 
fellow-religionists, not to speak about followers of other religionists. Past and present 
history is  full of examples to prove this fact.  
"They will not fight against you in a body, except in fenced towns, or from behind 
walls. Their strength in war among themselves is great: thou thinkest them to be united; 
but their hearts are divided. This, because they are people who do not understand." (The 
Emigration–verse 14). 
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Islam confers upon everyone his legitimate rights. Islam prevents the incursion on 
other people's rights. The Zionist Nazi activities against our people will not last for long. 
"For the state of injustice lasts but one day, while the state of justice lasts till Doomsday."  
"As to those who have not borne arms against you on account of religion, nor 
turned you out of your dwellings, Allah forbiddeth you not to deal kindly with them, and 
to behave justly towards them; for Allah loveth those who act justly." (The Tried–verse 
8). 
The Attempt to Isolate the Palestinian People:  
Article Thirty-Two: 
World Zionism, together with imperialistic powers, try through a studied plan and 
an intelligent strategy to remove one Arab state after another from the circle of struggle 
against Zionism, in order to have it finally face the Palestinian people only. Egypt was, to 
a great extent, removed from the circle of the struggle, through the treacherous Camp 
David Agreement. They are trying to draw other Arab countries into similar agreements 
and to bring them outside the circle of struggle.  
The Islamic Resistance Movement calls on Arab and Islamic nations to take up 
the line of serious and persevering action to prevent the success of this horrendous plan, 
to warn the people of the danger eminating from leaving the circle of struggle against 
Zionism. Today it is Palestine, tomorrow it will be one country or another. The Zionist 
plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the 
Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to 
further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the "Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion", and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying.  
Leaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who 
does that. "for whoso shall turn his back unto them on that day, unless he turneth aside to 
fight, or retreateth to another party of the faithful, shall draw on himself the indignation 
of Allah, and his abode shall be hell; an ill journey shall it be thither." (The Spoils–verse 
16). There is no way out except by concentrating all powers and energies to face this 
Nazi, vicious Tatar invasion. The alternative is loss of one's country, the dispersion of 
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citizens, the spread of vice on earth and the destruction of religious values. Let every 
person know that he is responsible before Allah, for "the doer of the slightest good deed 
is rewarded in like, and the does of the slightest evil deed is also rewarded in like."  
The Islamic Resistance Movement consider itself to be the spearhead of the circle 
of struggle with world Zionism and a step on the road. The Movement adds its efforts to 
the efforts of all those who are active in the Palestinian arena. Arab and Islamic Peoples 
should augment by further steps on their part; Islamic groupings all over the Arab world 
should also do the same, since all of these are the best-equipped for the future role in the 
fight with the warmongering Jews.  
"..and we have put enmity and hatred between them, until the day of resurrection. 
So often as they shall kindle a fire of war, Allah shall extinguish it; and they shall set 
their minds to act corruptly in the earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers." (The 
Table–verse 64). 
Article Thirty-Three: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement, being based on the common coordinated and 
interdependent conceptions of the laws of the universe, and flowing in the stream of 
destiny in confronting and fighting the enemies in defence of the Moslems and Islamic 
civilization and sacred sites, the first among which is the Aqsa Mosque, urges the Arab 
and Islamic peoples, their governments, popular and official groupings, to fear Allah 
where their view of the Islamic Resistance Movement and their dealings with it are 
concerned. They should back and support it, as Allah wants them to, extending to it more 
and more funds till Allah's purpose is achieved when ranks will close up, fighters join 
other fighters and masses everywhere in the Islamic world will come forward in response 
to the call of duty while loudly proclaiming: Hail to Jihad. Their cry will reach the 
heavens and will go on being resounded until liberation is achieved, the invaders 
vanquished and Allah's victory comes about.  
"And Allah will certainly assist him who shall be on his side: for Allah is strong 
and mighty." (The Pilgrimage–verse 40). 
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The Testimony of History  
Across History in Confronting the Invaders:  
Article Thirty-Four: 
Palestine is the navel of the globe and the crossroad of the continents. Since the 
dawn of history, it has been the target of expansionists. The Prophet, Allah bless him and 
grant him salvation, had himself pointed to this fact in the noble Hadith in which he 
called on his honourable companion, Ma'adh ben-Jabal, saying: O Ma'ath, Allah throw 
open before you, when I am gone, Syria, from Al-Arish to the Euphrates. Its men, women 
and slaves will stay firmly there till the Day of Judgement. Whoever of you should 
choose one of the Syrian shores, or the Holy Land, he will be in constant struggle till the 
Day of Judgement."  
Expansionists have more than once put their eye on Palestine which they attacked 
with their armies to fulfill their designs on it. Thus it was that the Crusaders came with 
their armies, bringing with them their creed and carrying their Cross. They were able to 
defeat the Moslems for a while, but the Moslems were able to retrieve the land only when 
they stood under the wing of their religious banner, united their word, hallowed the name 
of Allah and surged out fighting under the leadership of Salah ed-Din al-Ayyubi. They 
fought for almost twenty years and at the end the Crusaders were defeated and Palestine 
was liberated.  
"Say unto those who believe not, Ye shall be overcome, and thrown together into 
hell; an unhappy couch it shall be." (The Family of Imran–verse 12). 
This is the only way to liberate Palestine. There is no doubt about the testimony of 
history. It is one of the laws of the universe and one of the rules of existence. Nothing can 
overcome iron except iron. Their false futile creed can only be defeated by the righteous 
Islamic creed. A creed could not be fought except by a creed, and in the last analysis, 
victory is for the just, for justice is certainly victorious.  
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"Our word hath formerly been given unto our servants the apostles; that they 
should certainly be assisted against the infidels, and that our armies should surely be the 
conquerors." (Those Who Rank Themselves–verses 171-172). 
Article Thirty-Five: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement views seriously the defeat of the Crusaders at 
the hands of Salah ed-Din al-Ayyubi and the rescuing of Palestine from their hands, as 
well as the defeat of the Tatars at Ein Galot, breaking their power at the hands of Qataz 
and Al-Dhaher Bivers and saving the Arab world from the Tatar onslaught which aimed 
at the destruction of every meaning of human civilization. The Movement draws lessons 
and examples from all this. The present Zionist onslaught has also been preceded by 
Crusading raids from the West and other Tatar raids from the East. Just as the Moslems 
faced those raids and planned fighting and defeating them, they should be able to 
confront the Zionist invasion and defeat it. This is indeed no problem for the Almighty 
Allah, provided that the intentions are pure, the determination is true and that Moslems 
have benefited from past experiences, rid themselves of the effects of ideological 
invasion and followed the customs of their ancestors.  
The Islamic Resistance Movement is Composed of Soldiers:  
Article Thirty-Six: 
While paving its way, the Islamic Resistance Movement, emphasizes time and 
again to all the sons of our people, to the Arab and Islamic nations, that it does not seek 
personal fame, material gain, or social prominence. It does not aim to compete against 
any one from among our people, or take his place. Nothing of the sort at all. It will not act 
against any of the sons of Moslems or those who are peaceful towards it from among 
non-Moslems, be they here or anywhere else. It will only serve as a support for all 
groupings and organizations operating against the Zionist enemy and its lackeys.  
The Islamic Resistance Movement adopts Islam as its way of life. Islam is its 
creed and religion. Whoever takes Islam as his way of life, be it an organization, a 
grouping, a country or any other body, the Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself 
as their soldiers and nothing more.  
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We ask Allah to show us the right course, to make us an example to others and to 
judge between us and our people with truth. "O Lord, do thou judge between us and our 
nation with truth; for thou art the best judge." (Al Araf–Verse 89). 
The last of our prayers will be praise to Allah, the Master of the Universe. 
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C. MAPS OF ISRAEL AND PALESTINE  
The Maps are focused on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
 
Figure 7: Map of Israel443 
 
Figure 8: Map of the Gaza Strip444 
                                                 
443  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Map Center: Country Maps, 
Israel," OCHA, http://ochaonline.un.org/Portals/18/maps/israel.jpg (accessed February 25, 2009). 
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Figure 9: Map of the West Bank445 
                                                 
444  Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Gaza Strip," CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html (accessed February 25, 2009). 
445  Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: West Bank," CIA, 
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